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In this chapter we review research on empathy in terms of its benefits and costs. Scholars 
have a difficult time agreeing on a definition of empathy. Some think of empathy as emerging 
from more cognitive mechanisms (emphasizing perspective taking and related theory of mind) 
which involves imagining another’s point of view or internal experience (Borke, 1971; Deutsch 
& Madle, 2009), while other scholars think of it as a more affective process (Batson, 1990; 
Bryant, 1982; Panksepp, 1998; Watt, 2007) with relatively ancient roots in the mammalian 
kingdom. This affective process includes emotion-matching with others, which is typically 
described as ‘contagion’ or affective resonance (Feshbach & Roe, 1968; Watt, 2007). It also 
includes concern for others’ suffering and a desire to reduce suffering that does not necessarily 
involve isomorphism with the other’s feelings, often called ‘empathic concern’ (Batson, Ahmad, 
& Stocks, 2004; Davis, 1983). Some have posited that affective resonance naturally implies 
empathic concern, which is an important point to address in future research (Watt, 2007). Still 
other theorists see the emotional and cognitive aspects of empathy as more overlapping than 
separate (Hoffman, 1984). Finally, another relevant distinction is between ‘dispositional’ or 
‘trait’ empathy (Bryant, 1982; Davis, 1983) versus ‘situational’ or induced empathy (Batson, 
1990). People scoring high in dispositional empathy see themselves as having chronic tendencies 
to respond empathically, yet nearly everyone can have their empathy engaged under the right 
circumstances, or conversely, disengaged under opposed circumstances, suggesting that empathy 
is a heavily ‘gated’ or modulated process (Watt, 2007). Dispositional empathy measures are 
typically used in correlational studies, limiting the causal inferences that can be made, whereas 
situational empathy is induced by randomly assigning participants to imagine the world from 
needy targets’ perspectives versus remaining objective when exposed to needy targets (see the 
work of Daniel Batson and colleagues for more details).  
Despite all of these distinctions, it is still possible to come up with a general definition 
that encompasses both cognitive elements and emotional ones, and can also be applied to trait 
and situational empathy. Thus, we would define empathy in line with prior theorists as 
experiencing perspectives and feelings more congruent with another’s situation than with one’s 
own (Decety & Lamm, 2006). 
 
Part 1: The Positive Psychology of Empathy 
 
Empathy has a good reputation, and as we will review, there are good reasons for this. 
The majority of research on empathy finds desirable correlates (for dispositional empathy) and 
outcomes (for situational empathy), whether for empathic individuals themselves, or their social 
interaction partners. It is difficult to find studies that point out potential problems with empathy, 
but even roses have thorns, and empathy comes with a few potential thorns despite its mostly 
prosocial, attractive, and adaptive qualities. These will be discussed in Part 2 of this chapter.  
 
Is empathy good for others? 
 
Empathy for strangers. The most obvious and widely studied benefit of high empathy is 
its association with more prosocial behaviors directed toward strangers. In a meta-analysis 
examining the relationship between different kinds of empathy and prosocial behaviors such as 
helping, sharing, and giving to others, researchers found significant positive relationships 
between the two, regardless of how empathy was measured (i.e. self-reported traits, observer-
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reported traits, self-reported empathic emotions, or situational inductions to empathize versus 
remain objective; Eisenberg & Miller, 1987).  
 Moreover, the work of Daniel Batson and his colleagues has tested the limits of such 
empathy-based prosocial responding (for a detailed overview, see (Batson, 2011). Using 
experimental studies, they have found that when participants are asked to imagine the feelings 
and perspectives of others they are more likely to demonstrate prosocial behaviors and attitudes 
even when:  
i) escaping from the situation is easy (Appendix B in Batson, 2011),  
ii) helping is anonymous and participants cannot receive credit for helping (Appendix C), 
 iii) there are good reasons to avoid helping; doing so is easily justified (Appendix D), 
iv) participants are not given feedback about the effectiveness of their help, thus they are 
not motivated by feelings of gratification or self-efficacy (Appendix F), and  
v) when not helping leads to a similar mood boost as helping would (Appendix G).  
 
Moreover, increased situational empathy also makes the helping more sensitive and 
attuned to the recipient’s needs. After empathy is induced, participants seem to genuinely care 
about whether their help actually addresses the other’s need, and report feeling bad if their efforts 
were not helpful, even if it was through no fault of their own (Batson et al., 1988; Batson & 
Weeks, 1996). This suggests some kind of direct linkage between affective resonance/contagion 
mechanisms and an intrinsic motivation to reduce suffering (as hypothesized in Watt, 2007). 
More evidence of their increased sensitivity comes from research finding that empathy-induced 
participants are only more likely to help if it is good for the recipient in the long-term. If there is 
a short-term benefit of helping the recipient, but at the cost of a long-term harm to this recipient, 
people induced to be in more empathic states are actually less likely to help (Sibicky, Schroeder, 
& Dovidio, 1995).  
Situational empathy also increases people’s cooperativeness in prisoner’s dilemma games 
( Batson & Ahmad, 2001;  Batson & Moran, 1999; Cohen & Insko, 2008; Rumble, Van Lange, 
& Parks, 2010), which are games in which participants choose to cooperate or defect with 
partners and receive payoffs based on their decisions. If both participants cooperate, the payoffs 
are highest, however, individual participants can receive a high payoff if they defect but their 
partner cooperates, which increases the incentive to defect. If both participants defect though, 
payoffs are low for both. Remarkably, empathy increases cooperation rates in prisoner’s 
dilemma games even when participants are aware that their partner has already defected ( Batson 
& Ahmad, 2001). For example, in this extreme situation, cooperation rates increased from 5% in 
the control condition (“remain objective”) to 45% in the empathizing condition on a one-shot 
(single-interaction) prisoner’s dilemma game (Batson & Ahmad, 2001). Related to this, 
empathizing has been shown to be helpful in negotiation settings as well, leading to greater gains 
for both parties relative to not empathizing (Galinsky, Maddux, Gilin, & White, 2008).  
 
Empathy in close relationships. Considering that empathizing makes people kinder and 
more cooperative, it is not surprising to find that empathy may have positive implications within 
close relationships. For example, empathy in parents seems to have a noticeable positive effect 
on their children (Feshbach, 1990; Moses, 2012; Rosenstein, 1995). One example of this is a 
study of pediatric cancer patients in which the researchers found that more empathic parental 
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responses to their children’s pain during a medical procedure was associated with the subjective 
experience of less pain in the children (Penner et al., 2008).  
Within romantic relationships, some research has found that people scoring high in 
perspective taking (cognitive empathy) report being more satisfied with their relationships 
(Franzoi, Davis, & Young, 1985). Of course, this could mean that more relationship satisfaction 
leads to higher perspective taking, but this explanation is less likely because relationship 
satisfaction is more likely to fluctuate than a personality trait (as a classic example of state versus 
trait). Another interesting study found that married people with higher dispositional empathy are 
less likely to ruminate over perceived transgressions, and more likely to forgive their partners for 
these transgressions, with downstream consequences on higher marital quality (Fincham, Paleari, 
& Regalia, 2002; Paleari, Regalia, & Fincham, 2005). Again, the correlational nature of the study 
makes interpretations difficult, but the same reasoning applies to this study: perceptions of 
marital quality are also more likely to fluctuate than personality traits.  
Longitudinal studies confirm that the direction of causality is likely to go from empathic 
traits towards better relationships. For example, one recent study found that higher 
compassionate goals at one time point were associated with increased closeness, trust, and 
support in relationships at a later time point (Crocker & Canevello, 2008). Another study found 
that people with higher dispositional empathy (measured at baseline) gave more emotional and 
instrumental support when their relationship partner was put in a stressful situation during a later 
laboratory session (Feeney & Collins, 2001).  
Yet here is where things may get more complicated. Most of us enjoy having (and being) 
empathic partners, but there are certain circumstances where this may not be as desirable. For 
example, when there is uncertainty or threat in the relationship, being able to accurately read 
your partner’s mind might give you a window into his or her doubt, interest in others, or desire to 
end the relationship. There are a number of studies that confirm such a possibility, by using a 
performance-based measure of perspective taking. This involves having Partner A report on what 
he or she was thinking and feeling during a videotaped segment (e.g. while discussing a 
relationship problem together), and then having Partner B guess what Partner A was thinking and 
feeling. The more similar Partner B’s guesses are to Partner A’s responses, the higher his or her 
empathic accuracy (Ickes, 1997).  
 In long-term dating relationships, which are seen as relatively more secure by virtue of 
their endurance, higher empathic accuracy is correlated with more relationship satisfaction 
(Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). In other words, more satisfied longer-term couples can more 
accurately read each others’ thoughts and feelings while discussing relationship problems, 
perhaps because they are experienced in doing so. Yet the opposite pattern is found for short-
term dating relationships, where higher empathic accuracy is correlated with less relationship 
satisfaction (Thomas & Fletcher, 2003). In other words, less satisfied shorter-term couples are 
quite good at reading each others’ internal states when discussing relationship problems. This 
may be because many relationships dissolve within the first few months, and less satisfied new 
couples may be especially vigilant to potential signs of threat. Other research directly 
manipulates levels of threat, finding that when couples are discussing problems that are very 
threatening to their relationship, the more empathically accurate perceivers are about their 
partner’s thoughts and feelings, the more their feelings of closeness decline from the beginning 
to the end of the study (Ickes, Oriña, & Simpson, 2003). However, if they are discussing less 
threatening topics, greater empathic accuracy is associated with increased feelings of closeness 
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with their partner (Ickes, et al., 2003). Indeed, some partners may strategically become “mind-
blind” (lose their theory of mind so to speak) as a relationship-enhancing strategy. People who 
feel insecure about the stability of their relationship are very poor at accurately reading their 
partner’s feelings and thoughts in high-threat situations (e.g. when their partners are asked to rate 
the attractiveness levels of attractive members of the opposite sex; Simpson, Ickes, & 
Blackstone, 1995). It is probably wise to have poor empathic accuracy skills when such skills 
would reveal their partner’s interest in attractive others. Yet, some people cannot seem to inhibit 
their empathic accuracy in the face of such threats, those with chronic anxious-ambivalent 
attachment styles (Simpson, Ickes, & Grich, 1999). Ultimately this is upsetting both to them 
(more contagion-based distress) and their relationships (less close, more likely to end; Simpson, 
et al., 1999).  
Why have we included these complex results in the section on the “positive” psychology 
of empathy? This is because it is unclear whether they are truly negative. Being aware that your 
partner has been experiencing doubts or may be attracted to someone else could facilitate a 
conversation about it, which could ultimately strengthen the relationship. Or, it might selectively 
facilitate relationship dissolution in relationships that are unhealthy or otherwise problematic. 
The long-term implications of empathic accuracy are unclear, even if in certain contexts less 
(empathic accuracy) is more (for relationships). In any case, there is currently very little 
experimental research in the domain of empathy and close relationships (Batson, 2011). Given 
these mixed results, examining the effect of randomly assigned empathy interventions (versus 
control interventions) on relationship outcomes is needed. Such interventions should also 
consider the moderating role of threat, since some relationships may be destabilized by increased 
empathy.  
 
Empathy in professional settings. There is a robust literature on the role of empathy in 
professional settings, and especially within caring-related professions such as teaching, 
medicine, and clinical psychology. Teachers, doctors, and therapists with high empathy may 
positively influence their students’ educational outcomes, and patients’ physical health and 
mental health. For example, studies find associations between empathy in instructors and higher 
student motivation and effort, using both correlational and longitudinal designs (Coffman, 1981; 
Waxman, 1983). Empathy in instructors is also positively correlated with actual achievement 
outcomes (Aspy & Roebuck, 1972; Chang, Berger, & Chang, 1981), a result that is consistent 
regardless of the type of outcome (i.e. objective outcomes such as multiple choice questions, 
versus more subjective outcomes such as essays). Results are also similar for objective (e.g. 
based on observer or student report) versus more subjective (e.g. based on self report) measures 
of empathy. However, there is a need for research that experimentally links enhanced teacher 
empathy with student outcomes. Interestingly, college students’ perceptions of the professor’s 
concern and consideration (i.e. empathy) is the single largest predictor of overall teacher 
evaluations (Keaveny & McGann, 1978). Perceived teacher empathy explains 54.1% of the 
variance, while perceived teacher competence explains only 6.9% of the variance. Perhaps that 
fact alone would be enough to convince educators to participate in empathy training sessions. 
Such results may also suggest that students actually need more empathy – and feel more 
insecurities – than teachers and professors typically anticipate. 
Empathy in physicians (as rated by self-report or by observers) is related to a number of 
patient outcomes including higher patient satisfaction, better recall of medical information, 
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improved adherence to physician-recommended protocols (e.g. medication), and more positive 
health outcomes such as fewer symptoms and improved quality of life (Beck, Daughtridge, & 
Sloane, 2002; Derksen, Bensing, & Lagro-Janssen, 2013). There are similar associations between 
empathy in psychologists and therapists and patient mental health outcomes (Kurtz & Grummon, 
1972; Truax et al., 1966). It is notable that empathic doctors also report making fewer medical 
errors, although this may be explained by a self-report bias (West et al., 2006).  
 
Empathy, aggression, and prejudice. High empathy also seems to have an inhibiting 
effect on antisocial behaviors such as aggression, bullying, and various types of criminal 
behavior (Batson, et al., 2004; Jolliffe & Farrington, 2004; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). However, 
the effect sizes found in meta-analyses are relatively small overall and depend on a number of 
factors such as the type of measurement of empathy and antisocial behavior (Jolliffe & 
Farrington, 2004; Miller & Eisenberg, 1988). For example, the effects are strongest in self-
reported measures of trait empathy, which may reflect self-perceptions of empathy rather than 
truly altruistic motivations (Batson, Bolen, Cross, & Neuringer-Benefiel, 1986). It is possible 
that the desire “to look like a nice person” can make people self-report that they are both nice 
and also low in aggressiveness ( Batson, et al., 2004) – a selective reporting bias rather than a 
true association.  
In studies where empathy is manipulated, the results are inconsistent. For example, one 
study found that perspective-taking instructions had no effect on aggressive behavior, but this 
was possibly because participants received negative feedback from the target of aggression 
before the empathy manipulation (Eliasz, 1980). Another study found that perspective-taking 
instructions did cause a decrease of aggressive behavior, but only under conditions of low threat. 
After a provocation, participants who received the empathy manipulation responded with similar 
levels of aggression as those in the control group (Richardson, Hammock, Smith, Gardner, & 
Signo, 1994). Yet another study has found that perspective-taking instructions led to decreases in 
aggression-related brain activity after an insult. These decreases corresponded with decreases in 
self-reported hostility (Harmon-Jones, Vaughn-Scott, Mohr, Sigelman, & Harmon-Jones, 2004). 
Other related research has found that people scoring high in narcissism (a trait characterized by 
low empathy) are susceptible to increased aggression after they are threatened by insults or 
rejection (Bushman & Baumeister, 1998; Konrath, Bushman, & Campbell, 2006; Twenge & 
Campbell, 2003).  
Taken together, there is some experimental evidence that empathy may inhibit 
aggression, but this literature needs further work and development. Yet, when moving beyond 
general assessments of aggression, there is consistent evidence that empathy interventions do 
seem to reduce certain specific kinds of aggression in which empathy is directly implicated (e.g. 
abuse, sexual harassment, and victim blaming; Aderman, Brehm, & Katz, 1974; Schewe, 2007; 
Schewe & O'Donohue, 1993). Moreover, there is some evidence that empathy can reduce 
prejudice against stigmatized people or members of out-groups. Participants who are induced to 
feel empathy for people from different ethnic backgrounds, disabled people, the elderly, AIDS 
patients, homeless people, drug dealers, and even murderers report more positive feelings for 
them (Batson, Chang, Orr, & Rowland, 2002;  Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Clore & Jeffery, 
1972; Dovidio et al., 2004; Finlay & Stephan, 2000; Galinsky & Moskowitz, 2000; Vescio, 
Sechrist, & Paolucci, 2003). Reductions in prejudice after such empathy inductions:  
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i) exist regardless of whether or not targets are stereotypical group members (Vescio, et 
al., 2003), 
ii) increase the likelihood that participants will actually help a member of the stigmatized 
group (Batson, et al., 2002), and 
iii) can persist for weeks and months (Batson, Polycarpou, et al., 1997; Clore & Jeffery, 
1972). 
 
Inducing empathy for stigmatized groups can be a useful prejudice reduction tool because 
it is easy and inexpensive to administer. However, to date the majority of studies on this topic 
have examined the role of empathy in changing attitudes or feelings toward these groups. The 
effect of empathy on prejudice is more complicated when considering how empathy affects 
actual intergroup social interactions – as we will see in Part 2 (See chapter by Watt and Panksepp 
in this volume for further discussion of in-group/out-group effects on empathy).  
 
Is empathy good for the self? 
 
Excessively low empathy is a clear mental health risk factor, albeit with relatively broad 
implications. For example, one of the diagnostic criteria for Narcissistic Personality Disorder is a 
lack of empathy (APA, 2000). Similarly, although low empathy is not a directly stated diagnostic 
criterion for Antisocial Personality Disorder (APD), those with APD show a “lack of remorse, as 
indicated by being indifferent to or rationalizing having hurt, mistreated, or stolen from another” 
(APA, 2000). This clearly implies low empathy among this population without perhaps making it 
more explicit. However, the Psychopathy Check List (Hare, 1999), which is the most commonly 
used measure of psychopathy, includes an item related to low empathy. In addition, studies find 
that among individuals with an antisocial personality, the cognitive factor of empathy is 
preserved while the affective component is impaired. Individuals with antisocial personality have 
similar performance on Theory of Mind tasks compared to healthy individuals (e.g., Richell et 
al., 2003), but show weaker emotional responses when confronted with someone in distress 
(Blair, 1999; House & Milligan, 1976). 
People with autism spectrum disorders (ASD) are also thought to have lower empathy 
relative to normal controls. These populations indeed report low compassion in general and 
lower abilities in identifying the mental states of others (Bons et al., 2013; Frith, 2001; 
Mathersul, McDonald, & Rushby, 2013). ASD involve impairments in social functioning, in 
communication, and is associated with restricted repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviors, 
interests and activities. Individuals with ASD report lower levels of affective and cognitive 
empathy (e.g., Berthoz, et al., 2008; Frith, 1989) and have lower performance on Theory of Mind 
tasks (Hill & Frith, 2003). Several studies have found that individuals with ASD have difficulties 
in understanding others' intentions depicted in vignettes, in correctly identifying the mental states 
expressed by eye gazes, and in understanding false belief scenarios (Brent, Rios, Happe, & 
Charman, 2004; Hamilton, 2009; Mitchell, Robinson, Isaacs, & Nye, 1996). Moreover, 
neuroimaging studies have found anomalies in brain regions that are involved in Theory of Mind 
(Frith, 2001). For instance, when healthy participants and participants with ASD had to attribute 
mental states to visual animated triangles acting like humans (e.g., chasing), individuals with 
ASD showed less activation than healthy participants in the three brain regions involved in 
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Theory of Mind (medial prefrontal cortex, temporal parietal junction, and the temporal poles; 
Castelli, Frith, Happé, & Frith, 2002).  
 
 Within non-clinical populations, there are many studies demonstrating associations 
between empathy-related traits and behaviors and good mental and physical health (for reviews, 
see ( Batson, 2011; Konrath, 2013; Konrath & Brown, 2012; Post, 2007). These studies cover 
traits such as empathy, compassion, altruism, narcissism (low empathy plus inflated self-
esteem), and generativity (concern for future generations) and behaviors such as giving support 
to others, volunteering for non-profit organizations, and caring for animals. The trait-based 
studies tend to be correlational or longitudinal, but across both methods there are relatively 
consistent results. For example, highly empathic or compassionate people report better mental 
health (e.g. lower stress, anxiety, hopelessness, and depression), participate in fewer health risk 
behaviors (e.g. drinking or smoking), and have better physiological indicators of stress regulation 
(e.g. vagal tone; Adams, 2010; Au, Wong, Lai, & Chan, 2011; Diamond, Fagundes, & 
Butterworth, 2012; Ironson et al., 2002; Kalliopuska, 1992; Steffen & Masters, 2005) even when 
controlling for potential confounds (e.g. coping, social support: Au, et al., 2011), and even when 
considering a wide variety of populations (e.g. high school students, college students, community 
samples, people with chronic illnesses). Longitudinal studies confirm that having a more 
altruistic personality at one time point is associated with better mental and physical health 
outcomes later on (Dillon & Wink, 2007; Ironson, 2007; Konrath & Fuhrel-Forbis, 2011; Wink 
& Dillon, 2002). However, the role of covariates needs further clarification, with some studies 
suggesting that social class differences may be important (Dillon & Wink, 2007; Stellar, Manzo, 
Kraus, & Keltner, 2012) and others finding that the results are robust to a number of plausible 
confounds such as baseline health (Konrath & Fuhrel-Forbis, 2011; Wink & Dillon, 2002).  
Our research examines change in empathy and related traits over time by using the 
method of cross-temporal meta-analysis, which is a meta-analysis that tracks trends in self-
reported traits over time. We have found that scores on the empathic concern and perspective 
taking subscales of the Davis (1983) Interpersonal Reactivity Index have been declining over the 
past 30 years in the United States (Konrath, O'Brien, & Hsing, 2011). In addition, scores on the 
Narcissistic Personality Inventory, which assesses high self-focus in combination with low 
empathy, have been increasing across the same time period (Twenge, Konrath, Foster, Campbell, 
& Bushman, 2008). Given these changes, the relationship between empathy and health may 
become more important in the future if measures of empathy and related traits continue to show 
parallel trends.  
When reviewing the altruism-health literature it is important to consider the specific 
definition of empathy that some scholars use, which may not represent true other-orientedness. 
Personal distress is a more self-oriented reaction to others’ suffering. It can be assessed at the 
trait level, with sample items such as “When I see someone who badly needs help in an 
emergency, I go to pieces” (Davis, 1983), or as an immediate situational response to others in 
distress, by asking participants the extent to which they feel emotions like alarmed, distressed, 
disturbed, and upset, in response to others’ distress ( Batson, Fultz, & Schoenrade, 1987). When 
assessed this way, personal distress and empathic concern are two nearly orthogonal factors 
(Batson, et al., 1987; Davis, 1983). Although only calloused people could observe extreme 
suffering without having any distress response, people with unmitigated personal distress 
responses may be more motivated to help others in order to relieve their own distress, rather than 
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to relieve the other’s distress ( Batson, et al., 1987; Davis, 1983). As such, they are likely to seek 
other opportunities to relieve their distress, such as escaping the situation instead of helping, 
when possible ( Batson, 2011). Another way to think of this is that in order to be truly empathic, 
people will indeed suffer with those who are suffering (and thus feel some distress on behalf of 
them), but we must also have “intact affective regulation abilities such that the suffering of the 
other party does not flood us, and we are thus able to maintain our own affective equilibrium and 
largely positive state while we are motivated to reduce the suffering of the other party” (p. 21; 
Watt, 2007). Personal distress often includes unmitigated contagion with the suffering person, 
along with over-identification and poor personal boundaries. Thus, it is not surprising that within 
the context of mental health, personal distress is found to be associated with poor functioning 
(O’Connor, Berry, Weiss, & Gilbert, 2002).  
To date, very few studies have examined how situational empathizing affects the 
empathizers themselves. This is an important direction for future research because it can help 
unravel issues of causality in this literature. In our lab we have been studying the direct 
physiological consequences of empathizing for those who are asked to empathize versus remain 
objective in response to others’ suffering (Konrath et al., 2012). We elaborate on some of these 
issues in Part 2.  
There are actually similar results when examining how empathy-related behaviors are 
associated with psychological and physical health. For example, it is difficult to randomly assign 
people to regularly volunteer for non-profit organizations, although in recent years some scholars 
have done just that (e.g. Experience Corps; Fried et al., 2004; Hong & Morrow-Howell, 2010). 
Yet there is consistent evidence that people who regularly volunteer for non-profit organizations 
have better psychological and physical health, even when considering a variety of potential 
confounds (Konrath, 2013; Konrath & Brown, 2012). Importantly, a recent study found that in 
order to receive a health benefit of volunteering, people had to be motivated by care for others. 
Those who were motivated by potential ways they could personally benefit from volunteering 
(e.g. learning something new; feeling good) did not experience a later health benefit (Konrath, 
Fuhrel-Forbis, Lou, & Brown, 2012). Although this study did not assess empathy directly, it does 
imply that empathically-motivated giving is likely to be better for one’s health than personally-
motivated giving. 
 When it comes to the empathy-related behavior of giving social support to others (e.g. 
time, money, errands, emotional support), it is possible to randomly assign people to give versus 
receive support, and thus causal inferences can be stronger within this part of the literature. Yet 
the majority of studies still rely on correlational and longitudinal methods (Konrath & Brown, 
2012). Several correlational studies find that giving social support to others is associated with 
better mental and physical health (Brown, Consedine, & Magai, 2005; De Jong Giefveld & 
Dykstra, 2008; Dunn, Aknin, & Norton, 2008; Ironson, et al., 2002; N. Krause & Shaw, 2000; 
Schwartz, Keyl, Marcum, & Bode, 2009; Schwartz, Meisenhelder, Ma, & Reed, 2003). These 
results are confirmed in longitudinal studies (Brown, Brown, House, & Smith, 2008; S. Brown, 
Nesse, Vinokur, & Smith, 2003; Gleason, Iida, Bolger, & Shrout, 2003; Ironson, 2007; 
McClellan, Stanwyck, & Anson, 1993; Piferi & Lawler, 2006; Schwartz & Sendor, 1999; 
Vaananen, Buunk, Kivimaki, Pentti, & Vahtera, 2005). Experimental and quasi-experimental 
studies find that people who are randomly assigned to such diverse behaviors as caring for 
animals or plants, giving money to others, random acts of kindness, or giving massages to 
infants, all experience increased psychological well-being and better physiological outcomes 
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such as lower stress hormones (Aknin et al., 2013; Brown, Konrath, Seng, & Smith, 2011; Field, 
Hernandez-Reif, Quintino, Schanberg, & Kuhn, 1998; Langer & Rodin, 1976; Mugford & 
M’Comisky, 1975; Smith, Loving, Crockett, & Campbell, 2009; Tkach, 2005). However, 
inconsistent results have been reported in the literature: sometimes benefits only apply to certain 
groups of people, sometimes null relationships exist, and sometimes giving support can be 
associated with poor mental and physical health, especially when giving too much support or 
receiving too little in return (Buunk, Doosje, Jans, & Hopstaken, 1993; Fujiwara, 2009; Liang, 
Krause, & Bennett, 2001; Lu, 1997; Lu & Argyle, 1992; Schwartz, et al., 2009; C. Schwartz, et 
al., 2003; Strazdins & Broom, 2007).  
 Taken together, we can tentatively conclude that at least in some circumstances 
empathetic traits and behaviors are associated with good mental and physical health. However, 
there are a number of remaining questions: How can these results be explained? Why is empathy 
sometimes beneficial, yet other times costly for the self? Is there an optimal level of empathy, 
and if so, can too much empathy be more costly than beneficial?  
 
 
Part 2: The Negative Psychology of Empathy 
 
 These questions naturally bring us to the second part of this chapter, delving into a topic 
that has received some attention in recent times (Batson, et al., 2004; Bloom, 2013; Oakley, 
Knafo, & Madhavan, 2011;  Prinz, 2011). Can empathy at times be harmful? We now review 
research that suggests that empathy may have a ‘dark’ or at least ‘costly’ side and may be 
maladaptive in some specific contexts.  
 
Can empathy be bad for the self? 
 
As reviewed in Part 1, low empathy is a feature of some psychological disorders. 
However, some disorders may actually be associated with excessive empathy. One example is 
the case of the Williams Syndrome, which is a genetic developmental disorder associated with 
mental retardation and characterized by distinctive facial features (elfin). In terms of 
interpersonal behaviors, Williams Syndrome individuals are described as hypersociable, overly 
friendly, and affectionate (Jones et al., 2000). They also show unreserved approach behaviors 
towards strangers compared to healthy individuals (Gosch & Pankau, 1994), and greater 
evaluation of trustworthiness in faces (Bellugi, Lichtenberger, Mills, Galaburda, & Korenberg, 
1999). Paradoxically, preliminary findings suggest that despite their hypersociability, these 
individuals are often socially-isolated and report having fewer friends than individuals with 
mental retardation due to nonspecific causes (Dykens & Rosner, 1999). Williams Syndrome 
individuals are also described as empathetic (Riby, Bruce, & Jawaid, 2012). However, evidence-
based studies suggest that their empathic profile is complex. It has been hypothesized that 
individuals with Williams Syndrome might show a dissociation between cognitive and affective 
components. That is, their emotional responses to someone else’s feelings (such as affective 
resonance and concern for suffering) on the one hand and their abilities to understand others’ 
mental states on the other hand may not be well correlated (Riby, et al., 2012). 
Several studies suggest that individuals with Williams Syndrome have greater emotional 
responses to other people’s negative feelings than individuals with other developmental 
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disorders. For example, children with Williams Syndrome show greater empathic concern for an 
experimenter who pretended to hurt her knee compared to children with another developmental 
disorder (Prader-Willi Syndrome; Tager-Flusberg & Sullivan, 2000). Furthermore, Williams 
Syndrome children are more inclined to mimic facial expressions than matched control children 
with other developmental disorders (Fidler, Hepburn, Most, Philofsky, & Rogers, 2007), 
consistent with the distinction between contagion and theory of mind. Parents also report that 
their Williams Syndrome children experience more empathic emotional responses to others’ 
distress compared to other children (Dykens & Rosner, 1999; Klein-Tasman & Mervis, 2003). 
Yet when examining physiological indices of emotional arousal, individuals with Williams 
Syndrome actually show lower skin conductance amplitude in response to emotional faces 
compared to age-, IQ- and language-matched controls who present learning or intellectual 
disabilities (Plesa Skwerer et al., 2009). However, the findings should be taken with caution as 
the authors have calculated the physiological responses without differentiating the emotional 
facial expressions that were accurately and inaccurately identified.  
In terms of mentalizing or perspective taking (i.e., identifying others’ mental states) the 
data are not consistent (Kennedy & Adolphs, 2012). While some studies find that Williams 
Syndrome children can recognize emotional facial expressions as well as mental-age matched 
controls (Gagliardi et al., 2003; Porter, Coltheart, & Langdon, 2007), others have found deficits 
in the ability to recognize facial and vocal emotional expressions compared to matched controls, 
which might explain the previously noted lack of physiologic arousal (Lacroix, Guidetti, Roge, 
& Reilly, 2009; Plesa-Skwerer, Faja, Schofield, Verbalis, & Tager-Flusberg, 2006; Porter, et al., 
2007). Taken together, these studies suggest that it is not only empathy deficits that signal 
clinical problems within individuals; excessive empathy (specifically, emotional empathy) can 
also be indicative of certain psychological disorders. In Williams Syndrome, the data support a 
dissociation between the affective and cognitive components of empathy, such that Williams 
Syndrome is characterized by increased emotional empathy, yet lower abilities to identify others’ 
emotional expressions. This thus suggests that Williams Syndrome is characterized by a 
cognitive empathy deficit and thus more related to problems in theory of mind. If future studies 
support this dissociation between the two components of empathy, this may shed light on why 
individuals with Williams Syndrome are generally socially isolated. They might respond too 
much to others’ feelings relative to their ability to actually understand these feelings.  
 
Moving beyond the clinical domain to general populations, an extreme level of empathy 
may be dangerous if it motivates us to care for strangers – before establishing their safety or 
trustworthiness – at a potentially keen risk to our own personal safety and survival. It is likely 
that empathically-motivated and emotionally naïve ‘rescuing’ has prematurely shortened many 
lives in human history. And of course extending care to others leaves fewer resources (time, 
money, energy) for the self. Most genetic selection theories assume that organisms prioritize 
“selfishness” in order to increase evolutionary fitness by surviving and reproducing (Dawkins, 
1976). However, this is a very utilitarian point of view that may not accurately reflect the human 
experience of and motivation to care and empathize (Brown, Brown, & Penner, 2011). It also  
clearly does not reflect the survival value provided by intimate, socially bonded groups, and the 
fact that our preference for such groups appears to have been heavily selected in hominid lines 
(Panksepp, 1998; Watt, 2007). Moreover, surviving just long enough to reproduce would not 
necessarily increase evolutionary fitness – for maximal fitness parents must effectively care for 
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their children and grandchildren so that they in turn will survive and reproduce (Hawkes, 
O’Connell, Jones, Alvarez, & Charnov, 1998; Lahdenperä, Lummaa, Helle, Tremblay, & 
Russell, 2004; Liu & Konrath, 2013). 
Moving beyond extreme situations of empathy such as altruistic rescuing, it may still be 
possible for normal levels of empathy to be problematic at times. Caring and giving can 
sometimes be stressful, difficult, and draining, and concern for others can sometimes overtake 
people’s efforts at self-care, through caretaker fatigue and caretaker burden. Professionals who 
work in human service occupations can suffer from mental and physical health problems 
associated with the strain of giving as a full-time occupation (Figley, 1995). These problems are 
common in medical professionals, psychologists, social workers, lawyers, and corrections 
professionals, among others, in which regular exposure to highly stressful and traumatic 
incidents – either directly or indirectly – is part of the job description. Consistent with these 
notions, “compassion fatigue” is defined as the experience of “stress resulting from helping or 
wanting to help a traumatized or suffering person” (Figley, 1995, p. 7). These feelings of stress 
are normal and experienced by almost everyone within helping professions at some point in their 
careers (Mathieu, 2007). Compassion fatigue refers to the immediate feelings of stress that occur 
in such situations, however, these feelings can be chronically present among helping 
professionals because of the nature of their jobs. Indeed, between 42-70% of social workers 
experience ongoing high levels of personal and emotional distress as a result of their work 
(Adams, Boscarino, & Figley, 2006; Bennett, Plint, & Clifford, 2005; Bride, 2007; Pooler, 2008; 
Tehrani, 2010). “Vicarious trauma” occurs after repeated exposures to others’ traumas, which 
causes a change in the helper’s view of themselves and the world. It is “a transformation of the 
helper’s inner experience, resulting from empathic engagement with clients’ trauma material” 
(Saakvitne & Pearlman, 1996, p. 40). As such, it affects many different aspects of helpers – their 
emotions, their behaviors, their relationships, and their professional accomplishments. The term 
“burnout” is often used interchangeably with the above two terms, but we understand it to 
reference a longer-term result of chronic experiences of compassion fatigue that have shifted into 
vicarious traumatization. Often these experiences occur in combination with heavy caseloads, 
overwork and caregiver burden. The three commonly used dimensions to define and describe 
burnout are feelings of exhaustion in combination with a sense of cynicism and a feeling of 
ineffectiveness in one’s work (Maslach, Jackson, & Leiter, 1996).  
There are many risk factors that predict increased compassion fatigue, vicarious trauma, 
and burnout. For example, a number of individual differences seem to matter. People have a 
higher risk of compassion fatigue (or a related outcome) if they tend to be very self-critical 
(Osofsky, 2011), if they cannot emotionally distance when appropriate (Krause, 2009), and if 
they have conflicting feelings about their job role (Holt & Blevins, 2011). Younger and less 
experienced professionals (Baird & Jenkins, 2003; Hawkins, 2001), those without specialized 
training in trauma exposure (Sprang, Clark, & Whitt-Woosley, 2007), and those who have 
experienced prior abuse or trauma (Nelson-Gardell & Harris, 2003) are also more susceptible to 
compassion fatigue. Good relationships with coworkers (Armstrong & Griffin, 2004; Choi, 2011; 
Fielding & Fielding, 1987) and high social support (Conrad & Kellar-Guenther, 2006; B. 
Thomas, 2012) buffers the stresses of caring professions, as do flexible and supportive 
institutional environments and policies (Brady & Growette-Bostaph, 2012; Brough & Frame, 
2004; Choi, 2011; Gershon, Barocas, Canton, Li, & Vlahov, 2009; Violanti & Aron, 1995) and 
smaller caseloads (Noblet, Rodwell, & Allisey, 2009; Udipi, Veach, Kao, & LeRoy, 2008).  
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Yet “compassion” fatigue may be a misnomer, since studies have found that higher 
feelings of empathy and compassion actually buffer people in caring professions from such 
negative psychological states (Burtson & Stichler, 2010; Dyrbye et al., 2010; Gleichgerrcht & 
Decety, 2013; Shanafelt et al., 2005). Indeed, some scholars have suggested that the term should 
be replaced by “empathic distress fatigue,” since “burnout in caregivers and empathic [or 
personal] distress are characterized by the experience of negative emotions, which lead to a self-
oriented response with the desire to alleviate one’s own distress and both have negative effects 
on health” (Klimecki & Singer, 2011, p. 285). What is currently missing in this literature is 
experimental studies that examine the effect of empathy training on the later well-being and 
health of people in caring professions. With empathy training programs for people in caring 
professions becoming more common in recent years (Barkai & Fine, 1983; Herbek & 
Yammarino, 1990; Riess, Bailey, Dunn, & Phillips, 2012), this evidence is likely close at hand.  
 Personal distress involves feelings of being worried, perturbed, or upset, for oneself, 
while empathic concern involves feelings of compassion, tenderness, or warmth, combined with 
distressed feelings for the suffering other ( Batson, Early, & Salvarani, 1997; Batson, et al., 
1987). These terms are regularly used in order to measure subjective reports of personal distress 
and empathic concern in response to others’ suffering. Based on the valence of these terms and 
on evidence presented on compassion fatigue and burnout, one may hypothesize that individuals 
who experience more personal distress (i.e., unrestrained contagion mechanisms and poor 
boundaries), might also report greater physiological arousal and/or an enhanced stress response 
compared to individuals who experience more empathic concern or feelings of compassion. 
Greater arousal or increased stress activates the central nervous system, measured by skin 
conductance (Critchley, Elliott, Mathias, & Dolan, 2000; Lackner et al., 2010) and heart rate and 
blood pressure (Lackner, et al., 2010). The stress hormone cortisol is also released during acute 
stressful events, especially those that are uncontrollable and that lead to negative social 
evaluation (Dickerson & Kemeny, 2004). Therefore, one may hypothesize that personal distress 
feelings might be related to greater central nervous system activation and a greater release of 
stress hormones compared to more modulated empathic concern reactions.  
So far, few studies have examined this research question, but it has important applied 
implications. One study found that when mothers observed their child performing a difficult task, 
changes in the children’s cortisol levels were associated with changes in their observing mothers’ 
cortisol levels (Sethre-Hofstad, Stansbury, & Rice, 2002). This was especially true for more 
sensitive/attuned mothers. Another study found that when experimenters observed participants 
giving a stressful speech (the classic Trier Social Stress Task), changes in the their cortisol levels 
were associated with changes in the participants’ cortisol levels (Buchanan, Bagley, Stansfield, 
& Preston, 2012). This was especially true for experimenters who scored higher in dispositional 
empathy. Another study found that the more empathically accurate perceivers were about 
targets’ feelings of distress, the greater their CNS activation as indexed by skin conductance and 
cardiovascular activity (Levenson & Ruef, 1992).  
Taken together, these studies indicate that observing another person in distress may affect 
one’s own physiological reactivity, and especially in the presence of higher (dispositional or 
situational) empathic concern. This would suggest higher capacities for, or alternatively lower 
thresholds for, contagion type/affective resonance responses. These studies thus indicate that 
empathic concern is associated with an emotional resonance with others’ distress. Yet resonance 
means that highly empathic people actually had lower stress responses if the distressed other had 
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low stress responses, and only had higher stress responses if the speech-giver had high stress 
responses. This is different than saying that empathizing itself activates a stress response. The 
design of these studies does not allow us to determine what would happen in a more controlled 
setting, that is, if the target of distress remained constant. 
However, another study that did just that found that empathic concern is correlated with 
the release of cortisol when witnessing someone in distress (Barraza & Zak, 2009). This study 
assessed the endocrine responses of participants before and after they watched an evocative 
video depicting a father talking to his 2 year old child who had cancer. The researchers also 
measured subjective reports of state empathic concern and personal distress in response to the 
video. When controlling for feelings of personal distress, higher feelings of empathic concern 
were associated with a rise in cortisol after viewing the video. Moreover, the opposite pattern 
was found for personal distress: when controlling for empathic concern, higher feelings of 
personal distress were related to a decline in cortisol after viewing the video. Yet this study is 
still correlational, and the effects were not found at the raw correlational level – only after 
controlling for either high personal distress or empathic concern feelings. Thus, it is difficult to 
know how to interpret the results. An experimental research design can control for other 
confounding factors that might be associated with natural variations in empathic feelings. 
Ideally, participants would be randomly assigned to empathize versus remain objective in 
response to observing a target in distress, and physiological assessments would be taken before 
and after the observation. 
In our lab, we are examining this very research question. The empathy protocol that we 
use is taken from widely used and validated empathy inductions (Batson, 2011; Batson, et al., 
1988;  Batson, Sager, et al., 1997). Participants in our studies are exposed to a distressed target 
(e.g. a radio program about Katie Banks, who is supposedly another student who has recently 
lost her parents in a car accident). Using standard instructions, participants are either asked to 
“try to imagine how the person being interviewed feels about what has happened and how it has 
affected his or her life, from his or her own perspective” or to “try to remain objective about the 
person being interviewed and try not to get caught up in any emotions.” We hypothesize that 
empathizing (versus remaining ‘objective’ and more detached) in response to a distressed other 
may actually help to attenuate stress responses.  
Some background research supports this hypothesis. One study found that participants 
who were randomly assigned to give social support to a partner experiencing stress within a 
laboratory paradigm experienced declines in cortisol levels during the experiment (Smith, et al., 
2009). Although ‘giving support’ is not exactly the same as ‘empathizing’, this study does 
suggest that focusing on others’ needs may help to attenuate stress responses. Another recent 
study examined the cortisol responses of participants who completed the standard Trier Social 
Stress Task (job interview speech) compared to those who also gave a job interview speech, but 
were asked to focus on how they could help others if they got the job (Mayer et al., 2011). The 
researchers found that although participants in the compassionate condition reported similar 
levels of subjective anxiety during the task, they showed attenuated cortisol responses compared 
to those completing the standard task. Moreover, other studies have found moderate stress-
buffering effects of compassionate traits or training programs (Cosley, McCoy, Saslow, & Epel, 
2010; Kok et al., 2013; Pace et al., 2009). 
Clearly, more research is needed in this domain before we can determine the role of 
empathy in causing better or worse psychological health, stress responses, and ultimately, 
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physical health outcomes. For now, we cautiously include this topic in Part 2 until more 
conclusive research is available.  
 
Can empathy be bad for others? 
 
When held up to scrutiny, the evidence that empathy may be bad for the self looks weak. 
But the ‘dark’ side of empathy may lie in the interpersonal domain.  
 
Empathizing with undesirable targets. Imagine that you are walking down the street and 
you suddenly see a person being beaten up by another person. It is likely that if you feel empathy 
for anyone, it will be for the person who was beaten up. Instinctively, it is easy to believe that 
there are no situations that would make people empathize with aggressors or understand their 
actions. Yet several studies suggest that some people are surprisingly willing to empathize with 
certain undesirable targets (e.g., rapists, unfair or immoral people). For instance, one paper found 
that males report higher empathy for rape perpetrators compared to females (Smith & Frieze, 
2003). In two studies, participants completed a questionnaire assessing empathy for victims and 
perpetrators of rape. Results showed that men reported lower empathy for victims, and higher 
empathy for perpetrators, compared to females. However, because items were written to be 
gender neutral, authors could not evaluate if the gender of the target might influence the level of 
participants’ empathy. A recent study thus went in more depth and examined the association 
between empathy, type of target (i.e. victim versus perpetrator), participants’ previous life 
experience (i.e. sexually perpetration or victimization), and the gender of targets and participants 
(Osman, 2011). Participants completed an adapted version of the questionnaire from Smith and 
Frieze (2003), which assessed how much emotional empathy they might feel (emotional sharing 
with the victim) for a female versus male victim of a female versus male rapist. They also 
reported how much they took the perspective of the rapist (e.g. understanding of how powerful 
the rapist might feel). Participants also reported whether they had been victims or perpetrators of 
sexual aggression in the past.  
Of interest to the current discussion is the degree of empathy that participants felt for 
perpetrators specifically. When the victim was male, participants felt more empathy for female 
rather than male perpetrators, but only among participants who had never perpetrated sexual 
aggression. However, males with perpetration experience (sexual offenders) experienced more 
empathy for male rapists compared to male non-offenders and female offenders. This study thus 
suggests that it is possible, under some circumstances, to feel empathy for undesirable targets. 
More specifically, this study showed that some factors either related to the empathizer (e.g. 
sharing similarities with perpetrators because of prior similar sexual offending experience), or 
the perpetrator (e.g. gender of perpetrator) might moderate empathic responses for rapists.  
Although examining a less serious behavior, a well-known study suggests that it is 
possible to have empathy for people who are deliberately unfair (Singer et al., 2006). The 
researchers examined empathy for a target’s pain after the target had been fair versus unfair on 
an economic game. In the Ultimatum Game (UG), participants have to accept or reject monetary 
offers from other participants. One player, the proposer, proposes a certain amount of money to 
the responder who can either accept or reject the proposal. If the responder accepts, the amount is 
divided according to the proposer’s proposal. If the responder rejects, both receive nothing. Fair 
offers approach 50% of what the proposer is given. In this study, all participants were 
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responders, but the fairness of the offers by the proposers was varied by the researchers. Some 
participants received fair offers from proposers and others received unfair offers. Results 
indicated that there were gender differences in empathic responses to proposers making unfair 
offers. Among males, there was lower activity in the brain areas associated with empathic 
concern in response to unfair players’ painful experiences, compared to fair players, suggesting a 
clear attenuation of empathic response. There was even some activation of reward areas in 
males’ brains when viewing the pain of their unfair partners, suggesting ‘schadenfreude’ (the 
sense that someone is getting their ‘just desserts’ and does not deserve empathy for a painful 
outcome). However, females showed similar empathic-related neural activity in response to both 
fair and unfair players. This suggests that while males are influenced by the fairness of their 
partners, and may be less likely to empathize with undesirable (i.e. unfair) partners, females 
might be more likely than males to empathize with unfair others who are in pain. In other words, 
females may be genuinely more forgiving of unfair players while males take transgressions 
against principles of fairness more seriously.  
Another study examined the effect of manipulating empathy levels on cooperation with 
unfair others (Batson & Ahmad, 2001). Participants were randomly assigned to empathize 
(versus remain objective) with a partner who they learned would not cooperate with them in a 
prisoner’s dilemma game (see page 2 for a description of the game). The results revealed that 
participants who imagined their partner’s feelings were more likely to cooperate with their 
partner, even when they knew that their partner would not cooperate with them (i.e. would 
defect). This study revealed that not only is it possible to empathize with undesirable others, 
feeling empathy for them might lead to increased prosocial responses directed toward these 
undesirable targets. Although prosocial behavior is typically seen as desirable (hence, this study 
was discussed in Part 1), the desirability of prosocial behavior directed toward known cheaters is 
more debatable.  
Why does empathizing with unfair targets increase cooperation levels? There is some 
evidence that it changes people’s perception of the relative unfairness of offers, especially in the 
presence of high serotonin levels (Crockett, Clark, Hauser, & Robbins, 2010). Serotonin is a 
hormone that indirectly promotes prosocial behaviors and seems to inhibit aggressive behaviors 
(Crockett, 2009; Krakowski, 2003). Serotonin is critically involved in affect regulation (Selvaraj 
et al., 2012). People with better affect regulation (due to higher serotonin levels) might be more 
prosocial while people with more impaired affect regulation might be more likely to retaliate for 
unfair play. In their study, Crockett and colleagues (2010) used the same game that was used by 
Singer et al. (2006): the Ultimatum Game. In high empathy scorers only (based on a median split 
of trait empathy), the administration of a serotonin reuptake inhibitor (relative to a placebo or 
norepinephrine reuptake inhibitor) caused participants to judge more unfair offers as more 
acceptable, and thus, to be more likely to accept them. Taken together, these studies suggest that 
empathy is not associated with adaptive behavior only. Instead, they suggest that perhaps 
empathy should also be perceived as a social risk factor: greater empathy for undesirable people 
might make empathic people see unfair actions as more acceptable, which could make empathic 
people more vulnerable to exploitation and less able to set limits on unfair players or even 
antisocial individuals. This may be one circumstance in which empathizing may be bad for the 
self.  
Empathy (in terms of perspective taking) for undesirable persons might also have 
negative consequences for the empathizer’s own moral behaviors. Research has also examined 
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how taking the perspective of unethical or unfair partners in economics games influences 
participants’ judgment of their partners’ unethical behaviors and also how it influences their own 
behaviors (Gino & Galinsky, 2012). Participants who imagined the perspective of their unfair 
partners rated the behaviors as less immoral, shameful, and embarrassing compared to control 
participants. Furthermore, they themselves were also more likely to engage in unethical or unfair 
acts. These results may initially appear to contradict the above studies, which found that empathy 
for unfair actors was associated with increased prosocial behavior. However, in Gino & 
Galinsky’s studies the object of participants’ empathy and the recipient of the later unethical 
action were different people. Either way, empathizing with undesirable targets is problematic 
(although it bears mention here that empathizing in this context means perspective taking). On 
the one hand, it can make people more likely to cooperate with untrustworthy others, and on the 
other hand, it can make people internalize the undesirable behaviors of those untrustworthy 
others and recapitulate those actions on some other unfortunate person(s). Overall, empathy – 
again defined here as perspective taking in relationship to an antisocial player – might have 
negative consequences at cognitive and behavioral levels when one empathizes with someone 
who is unethical or immoral.  
Other research supports the conclusion that empathy directed towards certain undesirable 
targets can be morally problematic (Happ, Melzer, & Steffgen, 2011, 2013). In these studies, 
researchers manipulate perspective taking levels, and then have participants play either a good 
(e.g. Superman) or bad (e.g. Joker) character in a violent videogame. Participants who are 
assigned to take the perspective of the ‘bad’ character (e.g., by reading a fake Wikipedia article 
that depicted Joker as having had a violent childhood and an aggressive father) exhibit less 
prosocial behaviors (e.g. lower donations to a charity after the task), perceive neutral facial 
expressions as more hostile, are more likely to endorse violent behaviors as justifiable, and report 
more aggressive behavioral intentions (using scenarios) compared to participants who are 
assigned to take the perspective of a ‘good’ character (e.g., by reading a fake Wikipedia article 
that described Superman as coming from a loving family). These results are in line with the other 
results described above that contradict the assumption that being empathic always increases 
altruistic behavior, and is always a preferred and positive response. Rather, these two studies 
suggest that empathizing with (i.e. adopting the perspective of) ‘bad,’ antisocial and aggressive 
characters can increase one’s own aggressive and antisocial tendencies.  
In conclusion, research suggests that under specific circumstances, it is clearly possible to 
take the perspective of or have empathy for unfair people or even sexual offenders and that 
having empathy for these undesirable people might have negative consequences for the self and 
others. However, it bears mentioning that the majority of this research operationally defines 
empathy in the more cognitive way, as perspective taking, and we noted earlier, even people with 
antisocial personalities have intact cognitive aspects of empathy (i.e. Theory of Mind; Richell et 
al., 2003). 
 
Empathy can be biased. Imagine that you are walking down the street and you suddenly 
see someone being beaten up by someone else. Which victim would you be more likely to feel 
empathy for – someone who was part of your own group or someone who clearly was not? What 
if the victim was a woman rather than a man? An attractive woman rather than an unattractive 
one? What about a child or infant compared to an adult? What about a puppy rather than a 
person?  
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As reviewed in Part 1, empathy instructions or training can help to reduce prejudice 
toward stigmatized others, yet, these instructions would not be needed if we already naturally 
empathized toward these groups. Instead, people have a tendency to feel more empathy more 
quickly for people who they see as similar to themselves (i.e. in-group members). For example, 
one study asked participants to observe a target who was randomly assigned to either have 
similar or different traits and values from the participant. The researchers then measured 
participants’ physiological reactivity while they observed their partner getting a shock. 
Participants had higher reactivity for similar others (Krebs, 1975). Other experimental research 
has found that participants report more empathic feelings and direct more helping behaviors 
toward targets who are more similar to them (Batson, Turk, Shaw, & Klein, 1995). This concurs 
with the meta-analytic finding that targets who are more similar to participants receive more 
prosocial behavior, on average (z=.15, Eisenberg & Miller, 1987). Moreover, several studies find 
that activity in empathy-related brain regions is attenuated for out-group members experiencing 
pain, relative to in-group members (Mathur, Harada, Lipke, & Chiao, 2010; Xu, Zuo, Wang, & 
Han, 2009). Finally, emotionally close others also tend to receive more empathy than more 
emotionally distant people (Beeney, Franklin Jr, Levy, & Adams Jr, 2011; Cialdini, Brown, 
Lewis, Luce, & Neuberg, 1997; Norscia & Palagi, 2011). In other words, similarity, familiarity, 
and social attachment also modulate empathic feelings (Watt, 2007). 
 Other recipient characteristics also seem to influence the likelihood of receiving empathic 
responses from others. Although similarity to self does seem to matter in terms of predicting 
empathic responses, an even stronger influence is the extent to which targets are cute or baby-
like. One series of studies directly pitted similarity and “nurturance” against each other in terms 
of the likelihood of each evoking empathy (Batson, Lishner, Cook, & Sawyer, 2005). 
Participants were introduced to Kayla, who had a broken leg that required surgery and intensive 
rehabilitation. By random assignment, Kayla was either a 20 year old student (similar to 
participants), a 3 year old child, a 5 year old dog, or a 4 month old puppy. The results indicated 
that participants felt the least empathy for the most similar target (the student) and the most 
empathy for the cutest / most vulnerable ones (i.e. the child and the dogs). This suggests that 
some modulating variables for empathy inductions ‘trump’ others and thus becomes further 
evidence that empathy is fundamentally tied to the mammalian prototype of maternal nurturance 
and caretaking for relatively helpless infants, as suggested originally in (Panksepp, 1998), and 
developed further in Watt, (2005; 2007) and Preston, (2013). 
This can also play out along gendered lines. For example, a meta-analysis found that 
females (traditionally seen as the “weaker” sex) are more likely than males to be recipients of 
help (Eagly & Crowley, 1986), although it is unclear whether this is specifically driven by 
increased empathy. In addition, the attractiveness of potential recipients seems to influence 
whether they will receive empathy. People with higher trait empathy are more likely to 
spontaneously and unconsciously mimic others’ motor actions and facial expressions (Chartrand 
& Bargh, 1999; Sonnby-Borgström, Jönsson, & Svensson, 2003; Sonnby–Borgström, 2002), 
whereas lower empathy people tend to show spontaneous counter-empathic responses (e.g. smile 
in response to angry faces). However, recent research has found that empathic individuals are 
only more likely to mimic targets if they are attractive, but not if they are unattractive (Müller, 
Leeuwen, Baaren, Bekkering, & Dijksterhuis, 2013). Taken together, there is a tendency to 
empathize with weaker, more vulnerable, yet also more attractive recipients. It is no wonder that 
the cultural archetype of the “damsel in distress” is so evocative. 
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 Researchers have also found that participants who learn about single named individuals 
experience more emotional arousal than after learning about unnamed individuals or groups of 
people. This is called the “identifiable victim effect” (Kogut & Ritov, 2005), and it underscores 
the fact that empathy is in a real sense ‘personal’ and enhanced by making suffering parties 
appear to be real and identifiable people. However, it is unclear whether the emotional arousal 
that is experienced is empathic concern (i.e. feelings of compassion, tenderness, warmth, and 
feelings of distress for the victims) as one might assume. Research finds that participants feel 
equal amounts of compassionate emotions for both types of recipients. However, they experience 
increased feelings of personal distress (i.e. feelings of being upset, worried, disturbed, and 
troubled) after learning about the plight of single named individuals (Kogut & Ritov, 2005). 
However, researchers do not tend to distinguish between feelings of distress for the self and 
feeling distress for the victims, the latter of which is clearly empathic ( Batson, Early, et al., 
1997). Future studies could help to clarify the specific role of empathic emotions in the 
identifiable victim effect.  
Empathy and moral reasoning. The research reviewed above indicates that empathy can 
at times be ‘biased’ – favoring vulnerable, cute, attractive, similar, or close others, consistent 
with the ‘gating’ model of empathy proposed by Watt (2007). But can it negatively affect our 
moral judgments in certain circumstances? In the past decades, there has been much scholarly 
interest on the effect of emotions on moral judgments. For instance, researchers have found that 
presenting disgusting smells or tastes results in hasher judgments of moral dilemmas (Inbar, 
Pizarro, & Bloom, 2012), consistent with unpleasant sensory stimuli clearly biasing affective 
activation in a negative direction. In addition, more feelings of anger can lead participants to say 
it is acceptable to kill one person to test a vaccine in order to save millions of people ( Choe & 
Min, 2011). These examples show that there are obviously emotional components to moral 
decisions, particularly in relationship to moral dilemmas.  
Other research has suggested that empathy may also influence moral judgments. For 
instance, psychopaths and people with antisocial personalities, who are characterized by lower 
emotional responses (Pham, Philippot, & Rime, 2000) and lower levels of empathic concern 
(Mullins-Nelson, Salekin, & Leistico, 2006), show less severe judgments of moral transgressions 
such as taking money from a wallet found on the ground (Bartels & Pizarro, 2011; Blair, 1995). 
Thus, lower empathy clearly leads to less concern about harming others, and thus to less severe 
judgments (or personal distress) when harm actually occurs. Although it is true that other 
emotional responses may also predict moral judgments (e.g. disapproval – Prinz, 2011), empathy 
may still play an important role in moral decisions when there are direct victims of 
transgressions. For instance, empathy is unlikely to predict moral judgments when there are 
victimless moral transgressions or when there are no salient victims (Prinz, 2011). But feeling 
empathic concern for victims of a transgression may help prevent harm to these people. For 
example, one might readily consider it inappropriate to steal money from the found wallet 
because one feels empathy for the owner of the wallet.  
However, research has revealed inconsistencies in the association between empathy and 
moral judgments involving victims. Some studies have indeed shown correlations between 
empathy and moral judgments that involved transgressions with victims (e.g. stealing; 
Kalliopuska, 1983), while others have found no association (Lee & Prentice, 1988). These 
inconsistencies might result from the fact that empathy may affect only certain moral dilemmas. 
More specifically, empathy may play a particularly salient role in limiting utilitarian moral 
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reasoning, or choosing to harm one individual in order to save many individuals (Greene, 
Nystrom, Engell, Darley, & Cohen, 2004). Imagine that a trolley containing five people is 
heading for a broken track which will make it derail, killing all individuals aboard. The only way 
to save these five people is to kill a stranger by pushing him on the rails or by modifying the 
trajectory of the trolley so that it drives over a stranger lying on the rails (adapted from Thomson, 
1986). The decision is difficult because one must decide whether to harm and kill one person in 
order to save five, either personally (i.e. by pushing the stranger), or impersonally (i.e. by pulling 
a lever to redirect the trolley; Greene, Sommerville, Nystrom, Darley, & Cohen, 2001; Thomson, 
1986). Although it is unclear whether responses to such hypothetical dilemmas correlate with 
real-world moral behaviors, it is still important to understand factors that influence people’s 
moral reasoning – since milder and more realistic versions of ethical dilemmas are common.  
Feeling empathy for the stranger who would be killed in order to save the others might 
make people less likely to harm this person, which would thus prevent saving more people. One 
study has examined how people who make utilitarian moral decisions are perceived by others in 
terms of their empathy levels (Uhlmann, Zhu, & Tannenbaum, 2013). Targets who choose to 
throw an injured man overboard in order to save a boat full of people from sinking are viewed as 
less empathic by raters than those who decide to not throw the injured man (thus causing the 
whole boat to sink, and all the people to die). Therefore, making ‘utilitarian’ moral decisions is 
perceived as an intrinsically low empathy response.  
In another study, researchers assessed the relationship between trait empathic concern and 
responses to utilitarian moral dilemmas (Gleichgerrcht & Young, 2013). Importantly, the authors 
distinguished between two kinds of dilemmas: more personal dilemmas (i.e. harming someone 
directly, such as pushing a stranger onto the rails in the trolley scenario) versus more impersonal 
dilemmas (i.e. harming someone in an indirect way, such as modifying the trolley’s trajectory so 
that it ran over a stranger lying on the rails). More empathic concern was associated with less 
‘utilitarian’ moral decisions in personal dilemmas only. In other words, high empathy people 
might not believe that one person should be sacrificed to promote the general good. Thus, this is 
a case where high empathy may be good for specific individuals at the expense of others. This 
inhibitory influence of empathy on personal ‘utilitarian’ moral decisions was replicated in 
another study using a different measure of trait empathy (Choe & Min, 2011). Yet another study 
that used virtual reality to increase the dramatic realism of these scenarios found that participants 
who responded with more autonomic arousal (perhaps an index of empathic arousal) were less 
likely to pull the switch that would cause the single individual to die, and the others to be saved 
(Navarrete, 2012). Taken together, higher empathic responses may result in less ‘utilitarian’ 
moral judgments (i.e., save as many people as possible), but especially when empathic people 
might be personally involved in causing someone’s death (i.e., directly harming or killing one 
person).  
The influence of empathic concern on moral decisions has also been supported among 
clinical populations. For instance, patients who have frontotemporal dementia (FTD), which is 
associated with deficits in empathic concern, are unable to rate the seriousness of moral 
transgressions (Lough et al., 2006), consistent with evidence for orbital-frontal involvement in 
FTD (Rosen et al., 2002). Furthermore, relative to patients with other dementing illnesses (e.g. 
Alzheimer’s disease) and to healthy controls, patients with a frontotemporal dementia make 
more ‘utilitarian’ decisions in personal moral dilemmas (Mendez & Shapira, 2009). Other 
research finds that patients with lesions in the ventromedial prefrontal cortex, which is also 
20 
 
involved in empathic responses (Shamay-Tsoory, Tomer, Berger, & Aharon-Peretz, 2003), make 
more ‘utilitarian’ moral decisions than neurologically normal subjects (Koenigs et al., 2007; 
Moretto, Ladavas, Mattioli, & di Pellegrino, 2010).  
Taken together, there is consistent evidence that inhibition of more ‘utilitarian’ personal 
moral decisions is at least in part driven by capacities for empathic concern. When one tends to 
generally feel empathic concern for people who might undergo intense suffering, one prefers not 
to personally cause the death of a single individual in order to save more people from death. This 
thus suggests that being empathic might make it less likely that people will serve the common 
interest by saving as many people as possible in these moral dilemma scenarios. While this may 
appear maladaptive, it underscores that empathy is a proximal and ‘short-range’ pro-social 
mechanism concerned with immediate suffering that is directly in front of someone, as opposed 
to hypothetical suffering that might happen ‘down the road’ in the context of a particular 
contingency (see discussion of this in chapter by Watt and Panksepp in this volume). Therefore, 
more empathic individuals might disagree with the assumption that “the ends justify the means.” 
They might also not believe that one person can be or should be sacrificed in order to promote 
the general good. Future studies should investigate whether responses to such dilemmas 
correspond with real-world prosocial behavior.  
Other studies also suggest that the mandates of empathy sometimes contravene what we 
might conceptualize as ‘the common good.’ There are many situations when one’s empathy for a 
loved one might potentially conflict with one’s larger social responsibility. For example, “a 
father may resist contributing to public TV, not to buy himself a new shirt, but because he feels 
for his daughter, who wants new shoes” (Batson, et al., 2004, p 378). Or an aunt may be 
empathetically motivated to preferentially hire her less qualified nephew over a more qualified 
job candidate, and thus negatively impact her company’s bottom line. In addition, many 
occupations could be conceptualized as destructive to the environment or to notions of larger 
social benefit, but the motives for keeping those jobs may be in part empathic (e.g. to provide for 
one’s family). Indeed, two papers find that when people are assigned to empathize with specific 
targets, they preferentially allocate resources to this target at the expense of the larger group 
(Batson et al., 1999;  Batson et al., 1995). In this regard, empathy can be viewed as potentially 
threatening to larger notions such as ‘the common good’ as much as frank egotism. And yet 
these studies also underscore the intrinsically ‘short-range’ and proximal focus and social 
attachment ‘base’ of empathy – that we will readily sacrifice a larger and more abstract social 
good in order to preserve our ‘home base.’ Appreciation of such intrinsic trade-offs may make 
the ‘costs’ or ‘downsides’ of empathy in these contexts appear less obviously maladaptive. 
Indeed from the perspective of what has been selected evolutionarily (see discussion of this in 
final section), preservation of the family, one's small group, and the immediate social ‘home 
base’ has been clearly prioritized.  
Clearly, there are intrinsic trade-offs in terms of our potential personal allegiances versus 
larger social needs, and yet empathy can also motivate a variety of larger pro-environmental 
attitudes and behaviors with clear implications for the long-term common good (Allen & 
Ferrand, 1999; Preylo & Arikawa, 2008; Sevillano, Aragonés, & Schultz, 2007; Shelton & 
Rogers, 1981; Taylor & Signal, 2005; Walker, Chapman, & Bricker, 2003). Moreover, low 
empathy traits such as narcissistic entitlement are associated with exploitative approaches to 
natural resources (Campbell, Bonacci, Shelton, Exline, & Bushman, 2004). Given this, it is 
possible that empathy may sometimes promote and other times oppose what one may construe as 
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“the common good,” depending upon the target of empathy and other social contingencies. If 
individuals empathize with targets that represent the common good (e.g. animals, nature) then 
empathy might help to preserve it. But to the extent that they empathize with other more intimate 
conspecifics, they may allocate their limited resources toward these targets at the expense of the 
common good.  
Research suggests that at times empathy can apparently contravene another basic moral 
principle: concepts of fairness or justice. For example, studies have found that participants who 
are induced to feel empathy for certain individuals (e.g. a terminally ill child) are more likely to 
unfairly allocate resources to this individual (e.g. move her off a waiting list and into immediate 
treatment, which means that others on the waiting list do not get the treatment they need; Batson, 
Klein, Highberger, & Shaw, 1995). This occurs even though participants readily admit that their 
actions are unfair. This demonstrates that at times, empathic feelings can motivate unfair 
partiality, and thus at times lead to behaviors that might clearly violate concepts of fairness and 
equal allocation of resources. This again underscores the proximal, short range and 
intimate/conspecific activation locus of empathy. 
 
Aggression and prejudice. It is possible that empathy inhibits some types of aggression 
(see Part 1), but may accentuate others. High empathy may mitigate aggression in response to 
personal threats, but at the same time, it might accentuate aggression in response to threats to 
loved ones. This is a topic that has received virtually no research attention. Yet recent work on 
empathically motivated anger and punishment is an intriguing beginning (Haas, de Keijser, & 
Bruinsma, 2012; Vitaglione & Barnett, 2003). Moreover, there is a strong theoretical reason to 
predict that empathy might increase this type of protective aggression. Studies in non-human 
mammals have found that oxytocin, a bonding hormone, causes an increase in defensive 
maternal aggression (Campbell, 2008). One recent study found that breastfeeding human 
mothers exhibited higher aggression after provocation compared to bottle-feeding mothers and 
never-pregnant women (Hahn-Holbrook, Holt-Lunstad, Holbrook, Coyne, & Lawson, 2011). 
The specific role of empathy is unknown in this study, but future research can clarify whether 
people induced to feel empathy for others would act aggressively on their behalf in order to 
protect them from threat. This set of findings again confirms and is consistent with theoretical 
articulations of empathy as emerging from the mammalian affective prototype of maternal care 
and nurturance (Panksepp, 1998; Preston, 2013), and also consistent with empathy models 
coming from an affective neuroscience background (such as Watt, 2005, 2007). These models 
predict that empathy drives intensely protective behavior in relationship to relatively helpless 
infants and children, and that such protective behavior would be powerfully selected. Indeed, any 
species where infants are both relatively helpless and at the same time not powerful solicitors of 
protective responses from adult caretakers would likely quickly go extinct. 
With respect to prejudice, when people are specifically instructed to empathize with out-
group members, attitudes toward out-group members become more positive (see Part 1), yet 
empathy may not have a uniformly positive response on intergroup relations. Until recently, 
research on this topic has examined the effect of empathy outside of the context of actual 
intergroup social interactions. In contrast to abstract group rating tasks that do not involve 
expectations of social contact, intergroup interactions can evoke salient evaluative concerns, 
which are worries about how social interaction partners evaluate the self (Vorauer, Hunter, Main, 
& Roy, 2000; Vorauer, Main, & O'Connell, 1998). Of particular concern to many Caucasian 
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people is the concern that other-race social partners may see them as ‘racist’ (Vorauer, et al., 
2000; Vorauer, et al., 1998). Therefore, it is important to examine the role of empathy in contexts 
whether there is anticipated or actual social contact and the potential for evaluation.  
Research on this topic finds that efforts to empathize can have an ironic effect. When 
Caucasians try to take the perspective of other-race interaction partners, what they “see” through 
the other’s eyes is not always positive. Indeed several studies have shown that efforts to 
empathize (typically operationalized as perspective taking) may make Caucasians preoccupied 
with how others evaluate them and their group members (Lau, Falk, & Konrath, 2013; Vorauer 
& Sasaki, 2009, 2012). This makes them less likely to self-disclose (Lau, et al., 2013; Vorauer, 
Martens, & Sasaki, 2009), and even more so if they value being low in prejudice. In other words, 
being low in prejudice makes participants ironically less socially sensitive when they are asked 
to empathize with out-group targets, perhaps because their relatively progressive attitudes make 
them feel more complacent during these interactions (Vorauer, et al., 2009). Moreover, minority 
group social interaction partners report being less satisfied with social interactions after their 
Caucasian interaction partners are asked to empathize with them (Vorauer, et al., 2009). Taken 
together, it would be naïve to assume that empathy is always an inhibitor of aggression or always 
beneficial for intergroup relations. A deeper understanding of triggers of empathic aggression 
and problematic intergroup interactions is needed for both theoretical and practical reasons, and 
recent research suggests that harsh in-group out-group distinctions – potent variables in empathy 
induction and empathy inhibition – were selected to promote group cohesion (see extended 
discussion of this in chapter by Watt and Panksepp in this volume).  
 
Part 3: Reconciling the Positive and Negative Aspects of Empathy– Even ‘Great Things’ 
Have a Cost? 
 
From this review we can still conclude that the majority of research on empathy finds 
desirable correlates and outcomes. However, any theory of the origins of empathy needs to 
explain both the good and the bad (see Table 1 for a summary). We believe that the positives and 
negatives of empathy can best be understood within an evolutionary framework in which 
empathy evolved to enhance survival and reproduction – the central mechanism of all genetic 
selection. Many scholars see empathy as specifically originating in the parent-infant dyad, which 
then generalizes more broadly to other in-group members, then even broader still (Batson, et al., 
2005; De Waal, 2008; McDougall, 1908; Panksepp, 1998; Preston, 2013; Sober & Wilson, 1998; 
Swain et al., 2012). “If mammalian parents were not intensely interested in the welfare of their 
young—so interested as to put up with endless hassles, exhaustion, and even risks to their 
personal safety—these species would quickly die out” (Batson, et al., 2005, p. 20).  
 Although the ultimate foundation of empathy and altruism extended to strangers may be 
parental caregiving, the proximal, or day-to-day mechanism is likely the enhancement of social 
stability and the promotion of deep emotional bonds, which are typically stronger for one’s own 
offspring and kin, but can be evoked by nearly anyone under the right circumstances. This is an 
old idea: “Tender emotion and the protective impulse are, no doubt, evoked more readily and 
intensely by one's own offspring… but the distress of any child will evoke this response to a very 
intense degree in those in whom the instinct is strong…. In a similar direct fashion the distress of 
any adult (towards whom we harbor no hostile sentiment) evokes the emotion” (McDougall, 
1908, p. 72–74). These feelings of connection motivate us to suppress our own self-interest to 
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promote the well-being of others, and are facilitated by a number of neural and hormonal 
mechanisms that underlie both empathy and non-kin empathy and prosocial behavior – called the 
“caregiving system” (Brown, Brown, & Preston, 2012; Preston, 2013), and also the system for 
maternal nurturance/care (Panksepp, 1998). For example, there is evidence that certain brain 
areas (e.g. the anterior insula) and various peptide hormones (e.g. oxytocin, opioids, and 
prolactin) are implicated in both parenting and empathically-driven prosocial responses (Swain, 
et al., 2012; For a more detailed summary of neurological perspectives on empathy, see chapter 
by Watt and Panksepp in this volume). 
 
Explaining the positives of empathy.  
 
We reviewed evidence that empathy motivates more sensitive parenting, and also more 
sensitive and effective caring within the helping professions. Beyond this, empathy increases the 
likelihood that individuals will help those who are in need, and decreases the likelihood of 
certain types of aggressive responses. It helps people to see others, including those who are not 
part of their group, in a more positive light. Each of these findings could stem from the ‘parental 
instinct’ and emotional systems originally selected for maternal care being generalized to any 
needy or vulnerable target within reach, as argued by a number of theorists (McDougall, 1908; 
Panksepp, 1998; Preston, 2013; Swain, et al., 2012). When specifically considering the parental 
context, it is difficult to come up with any way in which increased empathy might be harmful to 
one’s own offspring, and easy to imagine how low empathy can decrease the probability of the 
offspring’s survival. If empathically driven aggression exists, it likely emerges from the obvious 
need for parents to protect their offspring from predators and would be highly selected. The more 
empathic these parents are, the more likely they should be to defend their child. Similar 
reasoning could apply to most of the positives associated with empathy.  
What about the potential that empathy can help to promote optimal mental and physical 
health outcomes? More experimental evidence is needed to verify the causal role of empathy in 
creating such benefits, yet there are theoretical reasons to predict such outcomes in many 
circumstances, based on the caregiving system model. Parental behavior involves both 
approaching distressed offspring while simultaneously regulating one’s own personal distress 
responses (Swain, et al., 2012). Clearly the caretaker cannot be flooded and immobilized by their 
own distress, but if a parent is not distressed by a significant injury to a child that would actually 
predict a relative absence of empathy, not its presence. Indeed intimately tied to effective 
parenting responses are a cascade of neurophysiological signals that help dampen stress 
responses (S. Brown, et al., 2012). For example, oxytocin is a hormone that is best known for its 
role in reproductive behaviors. It is released during childbirth, breastfeeding, sexual activity, and 
maternal caregiving behaviors (Carter, 1992, 1998). It has been shown to simultaneously 
increase prosocial behaviors and inhibit stress responses such as cardiovascular reactivity and 
cortisol surges (Bartz et al., 2010; Cardoso, Ellenbogen, Orlando, Bacon, & Joober, 2012; 
Domes et al., 2007; Kosfeld, Heinrichs, Zak, Fischbacher, & Fehr, 2005; Kubzansky, Mendes, 
Appleton, Block, & Adler, 2012; Uvnäs-Moberg, 1998; Zak, Kurzban, & Matzner, 2004; Zak, 
Stanton, & Ahmadi, 2007). Oxytocin also promotes positive physical health outcomes (e.g. 
inhibiting inflammation, while promoting wound healing; Clodi et al., 2008; Gouin et al., 2010). 
Taken together, oxytocin is one potential neurophysiological mechanism of empathic responses, 
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and a potential contributor to how empathy might have salubrious effects on general health, 
although this has been minimally studied (Barraza et al., 2013). 
 
Explaining the ‘negatives’ of empathy. Perhaps one overall perspective on the apparent 
negatives of empathy is simply that there is no ‘free lunch’ so to speak, and that selection effects 
upon behavioral mechanisms always reflect a prioritizing of certain needs over others – a 
prioritizing that may be highly protective overall but may have downsides and adaptive costs in 
some specific contexts. We reviewed evidence that empathy can negatively affect relationship 
satisfaction in high threat contexts, can make people act in accordance with undesirable targets 
of empathy, can be biased and suffer from partiality, can negatively affect some types of moral 
reasoning, and may at times lead to compassion fatigue. In terms it being associated with poorer 
relationship outcomes in higher-threat relationships, it might be a good thing for empathy to 
function as a double-edged sword. Being able to accurately infer what one’s partner is thinking 
can serve to maintain relationships that are positive, and end relationships that are more negative. 
This may facilitate caregiving behaviors from relatively stable and happy caregivers, by 
encouraging the less stable and less happy among them to find greener pastures.  
How do we potentially reconcile findings around empathizing with ‘bad’ targets 
(antisocial actors)? People tend to naturally empathize with “moral” people. This is likely an 
evolved mechanism designed to protect us from exploitation and to protect others from copycat 
bad behaviors. But there are times that we may identify with ‘bad’ antisocial parties – and those 
times can be problematic, both in terms of making it more likely that we will foolishly cooperate 
with untrustworthy or dangerous others, but also that we may become more like them than we 
ultimately might want to. Our capacity to empathize does not seem to have strict limits or 
absolute boundaries, which is desirable in terms of widening our circles of compassion to include 
more and more people, but possibly problematic in terms of the potential practical effects of 
empathizing with undesirable others. Imagine for a moment an extreme case of a Jewish person 
empathizing with Hitler’s sense of an aggrieved and devalued Germany in the 1930s. This would 
be hazardous, to say the least, and might inhibit a healthy sense of self protection and mistrust of 
Hitler's aims. This chapter cannot fully resolve the tension between the two poles – that we are 
able to empathize freely with anyone, but that it may not be advisable in all circumstances – but 
it just points out that these issues need to be addressed within evolutionary/biologically based 
models of empathy (see chapter by Watt and Panksepp in this volume).  
 Evolutionary models of empathy do illuminate empathy’s tendency to be biased, partial, 
and morally problematic at times. Infants are needy, cute, and easily distressed: they are masters 
at ‘pushing our empathy buttons.’ But so can any needy person (and any manipulative person 
who knows how to ‘push empathy buttons’). And so can any cute, infant-like person or animal. 
And by definition, members of our in-group are more similar to ourselves than out-group 
members. But that does not mean that it is impossible to empathize with less appealing others, or 
people on the other side of the world who might initially seem so different from us. Empathy 
may have evolved because more attuned mothers had infants who were more likely to survive 
and reproduce, but clearly its pro-survival comforts can readily be applied to anyone. We also 
need to be more aware of the variables modulating empathy if we want to know where barriers to 
empathy may lie.  
 Parental responses to infants are necessarily biased and partial. Most parents would never 
sacrifice their own child to save five other people, as in the classic ‘utilitarian’ moral dilemma. 
25 
 
And parents devote so much time and energy into their children that is clearly at the expense of 
many other needy children. It is likely that if parents of a sick child were allowed to choose 
whether their child should be pushed higher on a waiting list, they would not feel too conflicted 
about the other children who would be pushed lower on the list as a result. Successful parenting 
requires a level of dedication and commitment that has made some theorists aptly compare 
healthy parental behaviors to obsessive-compulsive disorder symptoms (Swain, Lorberbaum, 
Kose, & Strathearn, 2007). Committed parental care was likely selected by a dangerous early 
evolutionary environment in which extremely sensitive parents had offspring with greater odds 
of survival – and evidence suggests also that this appeared well prior to the emergence of primate 
and our own hominid lines, clearly being a shared feature of our mammalian heritage (Panksepp, 
1998). So, if empathy indeed evolved from parental caregiving behaviors, many of its negative 
attributes are perhaps less surprising.  
 The capacity for empathy also clearly contributes to the risk of compassion fatigue and 
burnout. Evidence is still needed to better understand the specific and causal role of empathy, but 
it is possible that in cases where parents give more than their resources allow, this could be 
dangerous. If a parent has only one piece of bread to eat, many would instinctively give the 
bigger half to his or her child. There is a reason why airlines have to remind us to “put on your 
own air mask first.” Within the evolutionary context, giving the child the larger portion in a 
scarce environment is giving the child a chance to survive and then later reproduce, even if one 
decreases one’s own chance of survival, yet with young children or infants, the death of a parent 
poses grave risks to the survival of any offspring. This suggests caution about uncritically 
embracing notions of ‘selfish genes’ (Dawkins, 1976), since powerful emotional bonds to 
offspring may motivate us to sacrifice ourselves to attempt to preserve loved and valued others. 
But as the air mask example suggests, it is possible for both parent and child to die if parents 
ignore their own fundamental needs. Thus, ideally parenting optimizes the resources between the 
parent and child, with a tendency to give a little more to the child if resources are scarce. To the 
extent that compassion fatigue and burnout are intrinsic vulnerabilities of empathy, the risk for 
this emerges in more extreme contexts, particularly where empathic responses yield little 
improvement in suffering. More research is clearly needed to understand the boundaries and 
limits of optimal empathy for one’s own well-being as well as empathy's costs.  
 
Concluding remarks.  
 
To our knowledge, this is one of the most comprehensive reviews to date on the potential 
liabilities associated with empathy (and we also refer readers to the excellent reviews of Batson, 
2011; Batson, et al., 2004). Overall, we would situate this review within an evolutionary/ 
biological framework that may help to reconcile some apparently contradictory results. Empathy 
is nearly always a desirable attribute in relationship to our loved ones and other social interaction 
partners, but it comes with a few ‘thorns’ that need to be reconciled with its otherwise highly 
adaptive nature. Roses have thorns because thorns were protective and perpetuated their survival, 
and the adaptive costs and downsides of empathy are likely explained in a similar way. An 
awareness of the limits of empathy can help us to better regulate it and ourselves to mitigate its 
costs and enhance its benefits. 
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Table 1. Summary of the positive and negative correlates of empathy 
 Positive Negative 
INTERPERSONAL   
Prosocial behavior Evidence that empathy inductions increase 
altruistic motivation to help strangers and 
cooperate, even under duress. 
Evidence that empathizing with undesirable 
targets makes people act in accordance with 
them, which at times can reduce prosocial 
behavior.  
Close relationships High empathy is associated with more 
sensitive parenting, and more relationship 
satisfaction in romantic relationships. 
Experimental evidence needed.* 
In high-threat contexts, empathy is 
associated with less relationship 
satisfaction. Experimental evidence 
needed.*  
Professional contexts High teacher, doctor, and therapist empathy 
is associated with better outcomes for 
students and patients, respectively. 
Experimental evidence needed.*  
Need more research on potential negative 
consequences of teacher, doctor, and 
therapist empathy for student and patient 
outcomes. 
Aggression Some evidence that empathy associated with 
less aggressive traits and behaviors, such as 
aggression in response to personal threats or 
aggression directed toward vulnerable 
targets. 
The possibility that empathy might be 
associated with increases in other types of 
aggression, such as aggression in response 
to threats to loved ones, has not adequately 
been explored in the literature. 
Prejudice Empathy inductions improve attitudes, 
feelings, and prosocial behaviors toward 
stigmatized groups. 
People are naturally more likely to 
empathize with in-group members and close 
others. Empathy inductions increase 
evaluative concerns during actual 
intergroup social interactions, thereby 
reducing self-disclosure and increasing the 
awkwardness of the interactions.  
Moral reasoning Weak or non-existent evidence that empathy 
can improve moral reasoning, although that 
depends upon the definition of moral. For 
example is it moral to kill one person to save 
more people (i.e. to be utilitarian)? Also, 
prosocial behavior is morally desirable.  
It is possible to empathize and identify with 
immoral others, which may impact moral 
reasoning. High empathy people make less 
utilitarian moral judgments (e.g. are more 
likely to save a single individual at the 
expense of a group of individuals). Empathy 
inductions for intimates and other 
conspecifics also lead to unfair preferential 
treatment of specific individuals at the 
expense of others.  
INTRAPERSONAL   
Psychological 
disorders 
Low empathy is a feature of some 
psychological disorders (e.g. Narcissistic 
Personality Inventory, Antisocial Personality 
Disorder, Autism Spectrum Disorders). This 
indicates that high empathy may be 
protective from such disorders. 
Excessive empathic concern and 
unregulated emotional contagion is a feature 
of some psychological disorders (e.g. 
Williams Syndrome).  
Psychological well-
being 
Higher psychological well-being among 
people with higher empathy and related traits 
and behaviors. Additional evidence needed.* 
Weak evidence that empathizing is 
associated with poor psychological well-
being. Experimental evidence needed.* 
Physical health At times improved physiological and 
physical indicators of health for people with 
higher empathy and related traits and 
behaviors. Experimental evidence needed.* 
Empathic people experience physiological 
resonance with others’ experiences, which 
can be bad if exposed to others’ stresses. 
However, experimental research is needed.* 
*Indicates that experimental evidence is rare. Most studies are correlational so far. 
27 
 
References 
Adams, A. (2010). The relationship among illness representations, risk representations, 
empathy, and preventive health behaviors. Marywood University. 
Adams, R. E., Boscarino, J. A., & Figley, C. R. (2006). Compassion fatigue and psychological 
distress among social workers: A validation study. American Journal of Orthopsychiatry, 
76(1), 103-108. 
Aderman, D., Brehm, S. S., & Katz, L. B. (1974). Empathic observation of an innocent victim: 
The just world revisited. 
Aknin, L., Barrington-Leigh, C. P., Dunn, E. W., Helliwell, J. F., Biswas-Diener, R., Kemeza, I., 
et al. (2013). Prosocial Spending and Well-Being: Cross-Cultural Evidence for a 
Psychological Universal. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 104(4), 635-652. 
Allen, J. B., & Ferrand, J. L. (1999). Environmental Locus of Control, Sympathy, and 
Proenvironmental Behavior A Test of Geller’s Actively Caring Hypothesis. Environment 
and behavior, 31(3), 338-353. 
APA. (2000). Diagnostic and statistical manual of mental disorders. 4th edition, TR; 
Washington, DC. 
Armstrong, G. S., & Griffin, M. L. (2004). Does the job matter? Comparing correlates of stress 
among treatment and correctional staff in prisons. Journal of Criminal Justice, 32(6), 
577-592. 
Aspy, D. N., & Roebuck, F. N. (1972). An investigation of the relationship between student 
levels of cognitive functioning and the teacher's classroom behavior. The Journal of 
Educational Research, 365-368. 
Au, A. M. L., Wong, A. S. K., Lai, M. K., & Chan, C. C. H. (2011). Empathy, coping, social 
support, and mental health in local and migrant adolescents in Beijing. International 
Journal on Disability and Human Development, 10(3), 173-178. 
Baird, S., & Jenkins, S. R. (2003). Vicarious traumatization, secondary traumatic stress, and 
burnout in sexual assault and domestic violence agency staff. Violence and Victims, 
18(1), 71-86. 
Barkai, J., & Fine, V. (1983). Empathy training for lawyers and students. Southwestern 
University Law Review, 13, 505-529. 
Barraza, J. A., Grewal, N. S., Ropacki, S., Perez, P., Gonzalez, A., & Zak, P. J. (2013). Effects of 
a 10-day oxytocin trial in older adults on health and well-being. Experimental and 
clinical psychopharmacology, 21(2), 85. 
Barraza, J. A., & Zak, P. J. (2009). Empathy toward strangers triggers oxytocin release and 
subsequent generosity. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1167, 182-189. 
Bartels, D. M., & Pizarro, D. A. (2011). The mismeasure of morals: antisocial personality traits 
predict utilitarian responses to moral dilemmas. Cognition, 121(1), 154-161. 
Bartz, J., Zaki, J., Bolger, N., Hollander, E., Ludwig, N. N., Kolevzon, A., et al. (2010). 
Oxytocin selectively improves empathic accuracy. Psychological Science, 21(10), 1426-
1428. 
Batson, C. D. (1990). Self-report ratings of empathic emotion. In N. Eisenberg & J. Strayer 
(Eds.), Empathy and its development (pp. 356-360). New York: Cambridge University 
Press. 
Batson, C. D. (2011). Altruism in humans: Oxford University Press. 
28 
 
Batson, C. D., & Ahmad, N. (2001). Empathy-induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma II: what 
if the target of empathy has defected? European Journal of Social Psychology, 31(1), 25-
36. 
Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., & Stocks, E. (2004). Benefits and liabilities of empathy-induced 
altruism. The social psychology of good and evil, 359-385. 
Batson, C. D., Ahmad, N., Yin, J., Bedell, S. J., Johnson, J. W., & Templin, C. M. (1999). Two 
threats to the common good: Self-interested egoism and empathy-induced altruism. 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 25(1), 3-16. 
Batson, C. D., Batson, J. G., Todd, R. M., Brummett, B. H., Shaw, L. L., & Aldeguer, C. M. 
(1995). Empathy and the collective good: Caring for one of the others in a social 
dilemma. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 68(4), 619. 
Batson, C. D., Bolen, M. H., Cross, J. A., & Neuringer-Benefiel, H. E. (1986). Where is the 
Altruism in the Altruistic Personality? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
50(1), 212. 
Batson, C. D., Chang, J., Orr, R., & Rowland, J. (2002). Empathy, Attitudes, and Action: Can 
Feeling for a Member of a Stigmatized Group Motivate One to Help the Group? 
Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 28(12), 1656-1666. 
Batson, C. D., Dyck, J. L., Brandt, J. R., Batson, J. G., Powell, A. L., McMaster, M. R., et al. 
(1988). Five studies testing two new egoistic alternatives to the empathy-altruism 
hypothesis. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 55(1), 52. 
Batson, C. D., Early, S., & Salvarani, G. (1997). Perspective taking: Imagining how another feels 
versus imaging how you would feel. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 23(7), 
751-758. 
Batson, C. D., Fultz, J., & Schoenrade, P. A. (1987). Distress and empathy: Two qualitatively 
distinct vicarious emotions with different motivational consequences. Journal of 
Personality, 55(1), 19-39. 
Batson, C. D., Klein, T. R., Highberger, L., & Shaw, L. L. (1995). Immorality from empathy-
induced altruism: When compassion and justice conflict. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 68(6), 1042. 
Batson, C. D., Lishner, D. A., Cook, J., & Sawyer, S. (2005). Similarity and nurturance: Two 
possible sources of empathy for strangers. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 27(1), 
15-25. 
Batson, C. D., & Moran, T. (1999). Empathy‐induced altruism in a prisoner's dilemma. 
European Journal of Social Psychology, 29(7), 909-924. 
Batson, C. D., Polycarpou, M. P., Harmon-Jones, E., Imhoff, H. J., Mitchener, E. C., Bednar, L. 
L., et al. (1997). Empathy and attitudes: Can feeling for a member of a stigmatized group 
improve feelings toward the group? Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 72(1), 
105. 
Batson, C. D., Sager, K., Garst, E., Kang, M., Rubchinsky, K., & Dawson, K. (1997). Is 
empathy-induced helping due to self-other merging? Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 73, 495-509. 
Batson, C. D., Turk, C. L., Shaw, L. L., & Klein, T. R. (1995). Information function of empathic 
emotion: Learning that we value the other's welfare. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 68(2), 300. 
29 
 
Batson, C. D., & Weeks, J. L. (1996). Mood effects of unsuccessful helping: Another test of the 
empathy-altruism hypothesis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 22(2), 148-
157. 
Beck, R. S., Daughtridge, R., & Sloane, P. D. (2002). Physician-patient communication in the 
primary care office: a systematic review. The Journal of the American Board of Family 
Practice, 15(1), 25-38. 
Beeney, J. E., Franklin Jr, R. G., Levy, K. N., & Adams Jr, R. B. (2011). I feel your pain: 
emotional closeness modulates neural responses to empathically experienced rejection. 
Social Neuroscience, 6(4), 369-376. 
Bellugi, U., Lichtenberger, L., Mills, D., Galaburda, A., & Korenberg, J. R. (1999). Bridging 
cognition, the brain and molecular genetics: evidence from Williams syndrome. Trends 
Neurosci, 22(5), 197-207. 
Bennett, S., Plint, A., & Clifford, T. (2005). Burnout, psychological morbidity, job satisfaction, 
and stress: a survey of Canadian hospital based child protection professionals. Archives of 
disease in childhood, 90(11), 1112-1116. 
Berthoz, S., Wessa, M., Kedia, G., Wicker, B., & Grezes, J. (2008). Cross-cultural validation of 
the empathy quotient in a French-speaking sample. Canadian Journal of Psychiatry, 
53(7), 469-477. 
Blair, R. J. (1995). A cognitive developmental approach to mortality: investigating the 
psychopath. Cognition, 57(1), 1-29. 
Blair, R. J. R. (1999). Responsiveness to distress cues in the child with psychopathic tendencies. 
Personality and Individual Differences, 27(1), 135-145. 
Bloom, P. (2013, May 20). The baby in the well: The case against empathy. The New Yorker  
Bons, D., van den Broek, E., Scheepers, F., Herpers, P., Rommelse, N., & Buitelaaar, J. K. 
(2013). Motor, Emotional, and Cognitive Empathy in Children and Adolescents with 
Autism Spectrum Disorder and Conduct Disorder. Journal of abnormal child psychology, 
1-19. 
Borke, H. (1971). Interpersonal Perception of Young Children: Egocentrism or Empathy? 
Developmental Psychology, 5(2), 263-269. 
Brady, P., & Growette-Bostaph, L. (2012). Direct or Indirect, It’s Still Trauma!” Examining the 
prevalence of compassion fatigue, burnout and self-care practices among Internet crimes 
against children task force members and forensic interviewers. Paper presented at the 
International Family Violence & Child Victimization Conference.  
Brent, E., Rios, P., Happe, F., & Charman, T. (2004). Performance of children with autism 
spectrum disorder on advanced theory of mind tasks. Autism, 8(3), 283-299. 
Bride, B. E. (2007). Prevalence of secondary traumatic stress among social workers. Social 
Work, 52(1), 63-70. 
Brough, P., & Frame, R. (2004). Predicting police job satisfaction and turnover intentions: The 
role of social support and police organisational variables. New Zealand Journal of 
Psychology, 33(1), 8-18. 
Brown, S., Brown, R., & Preston, S. (2012). The human caregiving system: a neuroscience 
model of compassionate motivation and behavior. Moving beyond self interest, 75-88. 
Brown, S., Brown, R. M., House, J. S., & Smith, D. M. (2008). Coping With Spousal Loss: 
Potential Buffering Effects of Self-Reported Helping Behavior. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 34(6), 849-861. 
30 
 
Brown, S., Konrath, S., Seng, J., & Smith, D. (2011). Measuring Oxytocin and Progesterone 
(Compassion Hormones) in a Laboratory vs Ecological Setting and Results from Recent 
Studies. The Neuroscience of Compassion Conference, Stony Brook University Medical 
Center(Stony Brook, NY). 
Brown, S., Nesse, R. M., Vinokur, A. D., & Smith, D. M. (2003). Providing social support may 
be more beneficial than receiving it: results from a prospective study of mortality. 
Psychological Science, 14(4), 320-327. 
Brown, S. L., Brown, R. M., & Penner, L. A. (2011). Moving beyond self-interest: Perspectives 
from evolutionary biology, neuroscience, and the social sciences: Oxford University 
Press. 
Brown, W. M., Consedine, N. S., & Magai, C. (2005). Altruism Relates to Health in an 
Ethnically Diverse Sample of Older Adults. The Journals of Gerontology Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 60(3), P143-P152. 
Bryant, B. K. (1982). An index of empathy for children and adolescents. Child Development, 
413-425. 
Buchanan, T. W., Bagley, S. L., Stansfield, R. B., & Preston, S. D. (2012). The empathic, 
physiological resonance of stress. Social Neuroscience, 7(2), 191-201. 
Burtson, P. L., & Stichler, J. F. (2010). Nursing work environment and nurse caring: relationship 
among motivational factors. Journal of Advanced Nursing, 66(8), 1819-1831. 
Bushman, B. J., & Baumeister, R. F. (1998). Threatened Egotism, Narcissism, Self-Esteem, and 
Direct and Displaced Aggression: Does Self-Love or Self-Hate Lead to Violence? 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(1), 219-229. 
Buunk, B. P., Doosje, B. J., Jans, L. G. J. M., & Hopstaken, L. E. M. (1993). Perceived 
Reciprocity, Social Support, and Stress at Work: The Role of Exchange and Communal 
Orientation. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 65(4), 801-811. 
Campbell, A. (2008). Attachment, aggression and affiliation: the role of oxytocin in female 
social behavior. Biological psychology, 77(1), 1-10. 
Campbell, W. K., Bonacci, A. M., Shelton, J., Exline, J. J., & Bushman, B. J. (2004). 
Psychological Entitlement: Interpersonal Consequences and Validation of a Self-Report 
Measure. Journal of Personality Assessment, 83(1), 29-45. 
Cardoso, C., Ellenbogen, M. A., Orlando, M. A., Bacon, S. L., & Joober, R. (2012). Intranasal 
oxytocin attenuates the cortisol response to physical stress: A dose–response study. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology. 
Carter, C. S. (1992). Oxytocin and sexual behavior. Neuroscience & Biobehavioral Reviews, 
16(2), 131-144. 
Carter, C. S. (1998). Neuroendocrine perspectives on social attachment and love. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 23, 779-818. 
Castelli, F., Frith, C., Happe, F., & Frith, U. (2002). Autism, Asperger syndrome and brain 
mechanisms for the attribution of mental states to animated shapes. Brain, 125, 1839- 
1849. 
Chang, A. F., Berger, S. E., & Chang, B. (1981). The relationship of student self-esteem and 
teacher empathy to classroom learning. Psychology: A Journal of Human Behavior. 
Chartrand, T. L., & Bargh, J. A. (1999). The chameleon effect: The perception–behavior link and 
social interaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 76(6), 893. 
31 
 
Choe, S., & Min, K. H. (2011). Who makes utilitarian judgments? The influences of emotions on 
utilitarian judgments. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(7), 580-592. 
Choe, S. Y., & Min, K.-H. (2011). How makes utilitarian judgments? The influence of emotions 
on utilitarian judgments. Judgment and Decision Making, 6(7), 580-592. 
Choi, G. Y. (2011). Organizational Impacts on the Secondary Traumatic Stress of Social 
Workers Assisting Family Violence or Sexual Assault Survivors. Administration in 
Social Work, 35(3), 225-242. 
Cialdini, R. B., Brown, S. L., Lewis, B. P., Luce, C., & Neuberg, S. L. (1997). Reinterpreting the 
Empathy-Altruism Relationship: When One Into One Equals Oneness. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 73(3), 481-494. 
Clodi, M., Vila, G., Geyeregger, R., Riedl, M., Stulnig, T. M., Struck, J., et al. (2008). Oxytocin 
alleviates the neuroendocrine and cytokine response to bacterial endotoxin in healthy 
men. American Journal of Physiology-Endocrinology And Metabolism, 295(3), E686-
E691. 
Clore, G. L., & Jeffery, K. M. (1972). Emotional role playing, attitude change, and attraction 
toward a disabled person. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 23(1), 105. 
Coffman, S. L. (1981). Empathy as a relevant instructor variable in the experiential classroom. 
Group & Organization Management, 6(1), 114-120. 
Cohen, T. R., & Insko, C. A. (2008). War and peace: Possible approaches to reducing intergroup 
conflict. Perspectives on Psychological Science, 3(2), 87-93. 
Conrad, D., & Kellar-Guenther, Y. (2006). Compassion fatigue, burnout, and compassion 
satisfaction among Colorado child protection workers. Child abuse & neglect, 30(10), 
1071-1080. 
Cosley, B. J., McCoy, S. K., Saslow, L. R., & Epel, E. S. (2010). Is compassion for others stress 
buffering? Consequences of compassion and social support for physiological reactivity to 
stress. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 46(5), 816-823. 
Critchley, H. D., Elliott, R., Mathias, C. J., & Dolan, R. J. (2000). Neural activity relating to 
generation and representation of galvanic skin conductance responses: a functional 
magnetic resonance imaging study. J Neurosci, 20(10751455), 3033-3040. 
Crocker, J., & Canevello, A. (2008). Creating and undermining social support in communal 
relationships: The role of compassionate and self-image goals. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 95(3), 555-575. 
Crockett, M. J. (2009). The neurochemistry of fairness: clarifying the link between serotonin and 
prosocial behavior. Ann N Y Acad Sci, 1167, 76-86. 
Crockett, M. J., Clark, L., Hauser, M. D., & Robbins, T. W. (2010). Serotonin selectively 
influences moral judgment and behavior through effects on harm aversion. Proc Natl 
Acad Sci U S A, 107(40), 17433-17438. 
Davis, M. (1983). Measuring individual differences in empathy: Evidence for a multidimensional 
approach. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 44(1), 113-126. 
Dawkins, R. (1976). The selfish gene: Oxford University Press  
De Jong Giefveld, J., & Dykstra, P. (2008). Virtue is its own reward? Support-giving in the 
family and loneliness in middle and old age. Ageing & Society, 28(02), 271-287. 
De Waal, F. B. (2008). Putting the altruism back into altruism: the evolution of empathy. Annu. 
Rev. Psychol., 59, 279-300. 
32 
 
Decety, J., & Lamm, C. (2006). Human empathy through the lens of social neuroscience. The 
Scientific World Journal, 6, 1146-1163. 
Derksen, F., Bensing, J., & Lagro-Janssen, A. (2013). Effectiveness of empathy in general 
practice: a systematic review. British Journal of General Practice, 63(606), e76-e84. 
Deutsch, F., & Madle, R. A. (2009). Empathy: Historic and current conceptualizations, 
measurement, and a cognitive theoretical perspective. Human development, 18(4), 267-
287. 
Diamond, L. M., Fagundes, C. P., & Butterworth, M. R. (2012). Attachment Style, Vagal Tone, 
and Empathy During Mother–Adolescent Interactions. Journal of Research on 
Adolescence, 22(1), 165-184. 
Dickerson, S. S., & Kemeny, M. E. (2004). Acute stressors and cortisol responses: a theoretical 
integration and synthesis of laboratory research. Psychol Bull, 130(3), 355-391. 
Dillon, M., & Wink, P. (2007). In the course of a lifetime: Tracing religious belief, practice, and 
change Berkeley and Los Angeles, California: University of California Press. 
Domes, G., Heinrichs, M., Glascher, J., Buchel, C., Braus, D. F., & Herpertz, S. C. (2007). 
Oxytocin attenuates amygdala responses to emotional faces regardless of valence. 
Biological Psychiatry, 62(10), 1187-1190. 
Dovidio, J. F., ten Vergert, M., Stewart, T. L., Gaertner, S. L., Johnson, J. D., Esses, V. M., et al. 
(2004). Perspective and Prejudice: Antecedents and Mediating Mechanisms. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30(12), 1537-1549. 
Dunn, E. W., Aknin, L. B., & Norton, M. I. (2008). Spending Money on Others Promotes 
Happiness. Science, 319(5870), 1687-1688. 
Dykens, E. M., & Rosner, B. A. (1999). Refining behavioral phenotypes: personality-motivation 
in Williams and Prader-Willi syndromes. Am J Ment Retard, 104(2), 158-169. 
Dyrbye, L. N., Massie, F. S., Eacker, A., Harper, W., Power, D., Durning, S. J., et al. (2010). 
Relationship Between Burnout and Professional Conduct and Attitudes Among US 
Medical Students. JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 304(11), 
1173-1180. 
Eagly, A. H., & Crowley, M. (1986). Gender and helping behavior: A meta-analytic review of 
the social psychological literature. Psychological Bulletin, 100(3), 283. 
Eisenberg, N., & Miller, P. A. (1987). The relation of empathy to prosocial and related 
behaviors. Psychological Bulletin, 101(1), 91. 
Eliasz, H. (1980). The effect of empathy, reactivity, and anxiety on interpersonal aggression 
intensity. Polish Psychological Bulletin. 
Feeney, B. C., & Collins, N. L. (2001). Predictors of caregiving in adult intimate relationships: 
An attachment theoretical perspective. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 
80(6), 972-994. 
Feshbach, N. (1990). Parental empathy and child adjustment/maladjustment. Empathy and its 
development, 271-291. 
Feshbach, N., & Roe, K. (1968). Empathy in six-and seven-year-olds. Child Development, 133-
145. 
Fidler, D. J., Hepburn, S. L., Most, D. E., Philofsky, A., & Rogers, S. J. (2007). Emotional 
responsivity in young children with Williams syndrome. Am J Ment Retard, 112(3), 194-
206. 
33 
 
Field, T. M., Hernandez-Reif, M., Quintino, O., Schanberg, S., & Kuhn, C. (1998). Elder Retired 
Volunteers Benefit From Giving Massage Therapy to Infants. Journal of Applied 
Gerontology, 17(2), 229-239. 
Fielding, N., & Fielding, J. (1987). A study of resignation during British police training. Journal 
of Police Science & Administration. 
Figley, C. (1995). Compassion fatigue: Coping with secondary traumatic stress disorder in those 
who treat the traumatized. Philadelphia, PA: Brunner / Mazel, Inc. 
Fincham, F. D., Paleari, F., & Regalia, C. (2002). Forgiveness in marriage: The role of 
relationship quality, attributions, and empathy. Personal Relationships, 9(1), 27-37. 
Finlay, K. A., & Stephan, W. G. (2000). Improving Intergroup Relations: The Effects of 
Empathy on Racial Attitudes1. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 30(8), 1720-1737. 
Franzoi, S. L., Davis, M. H., & Young, R. D. (1985). The effects of private self-consciousness 
and perspective taking on satisfaction in close relationships. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 48(6), 1584. 
Fried, L., Carlson, M., Freedman, M., Frick, K., Glass, T., Hill, J., et al. (2004). A social model 
for health promotion for an aging population: Initial evidence on the experience corps 
model. Journal of Urban Health, 81(1), 64-78. 
Frith, U. (1989). Autism: Explaining the enigma. Oxford, England: Basil Blackwell. 
Frith, U. (2001). Mind blindness and the brain in autism. Neuron, 32(6), 969-979. 
Fujiwara, T. (2009). Is Altruistic Behavior Associated with Major Depression Onset? PLoS 
ONE, 4(2), e4557. 
Gagliardi, C., Frigerio, E., Burt, D. M., Cazzaniga, I., Perrett, D. I., & Borgatti, R. (2003). Facial 
expression recognition in Williams syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 41(6), 733-738. 
Galinsky, A. D., Maddux, W. W., Gilin, D., & White, J. B. (2008). Why It Pays to Get Inside the 
Head of Your Opponent The Differential Effects of Perspective Taking and Empathy in 
Negotiations. Psychological Science, 19(4), 378-384. 
Galinsky, A. D., & Moskowitz, G. B. (2000). Perspective-taking: decreasing stereotype 
expression, stereotype accessibility, and in-group favoritism. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 78(4), 708. 
Gershon, R. R. M., Barocas, B., Canton, A. N., Li, X., & Vlahov, D. (2009). Mental, physical, 
and behavioral outcomes associated with perceived work stress in police officers. 
Criminal Justice and Behavior, 36(3), 275-289. 
Gino, F., & Galinsky, A. D. (2012). Vicarious Dishonesty: When Psychological Closeness 
Creates Distance from One's Moral Compass. Organizational Behavior and Human 
Decision Processes, 119, 15-26. 
Gleason, M. E. J., Iida, M., Bolger, N., & Shrout, P. E. (2003). Daily Supportive Equity in Close 
Relationships. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 29(8), 1036-1045. 
Gleichgerrcht, E., & Decety, J. (2013). Empathy in Clinical Practice: How Individual 
Dispositions, Gender, and Experience Moderate Empathic Concern, Burnout, and 
Emotional Distress in Physicians. PLoS ONE, 8(4), e61526. 
Gleichgerrcht, E., & Young, L. (2013). Low Levels of Empathic Concern Predict Utilitarian 
Moral Judgment. PLoS ONE, 8(4), e60418. 
Gosch, A., & Pankau, R. (1994). Social-emotional and behavioral adjustment in children with 
Williams-Beuren syndrome. Am J Med Genet, 53(4), 335-339. 
34 
 
Gouin, J. P., Carter, C. S., Pournajafi-Nazarloo, H., Glaser, R., Malarkey, W. B., Loving, T. J., et 
al. (2010). Marital behavior, oxytocin, vasopressin, and wound healing. 
Psychoneuroendocrinology, 35(7), 1082-1090. 
Greene, J., Nystrom, L. E., Engell, A. D., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2004). The neural bases 
of cognitive conflict and control in moral judgment. Neuron, 44(2), 389-400. 
Greene, J. D., Sommerville, R. B., Nystrom, L. E., Darley, J. M., & Cohen, J. D. (2001). An 
fMRI investigation of emotional engagement in moral judgment. Science, 293(5537), 
2105-2108. 
Haas, N. E., de Keijser, J. W., & Bruinsma, G. J. (2012). Public support for vigilantism: an 
experimental study. Journal of Experimental Criminology, 8(4), 387-413. 
Hahn-Holbrook, J., Holt-Lunstad, J., Holbrook, C., Coyne, S. M., & Lawson, E. T. (2011). 
Maternal Defense Breast Feeding Increases Aggression by Reducing Stress. 
Psychological Science, 22(10), 1288-1295. 
Hamilton, A. F. D. (2009). Research review: Goals, intentions and mental states: challenges for 
theories of autism. Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 50(8), 881-892. 
Happ, C., Melzer, A., & Steffgen, G. (2011). Bringing Empathy into Play: On the Effects of 
Empathy in Violent and Nonviolent Video Games. Paper presented at the ICEC 2011.  
Happ, C., Melzer, A., & Steffgen, G. (2013). Superman vs. BAD Man? The Effects of Empathy 
and Game Character in Violent Video Games. Cyberpsychol Behav Soc Netw. 
Hare, R. D. (1999). The Hare Psychopathy Checklist-Revised: PLC-R: MHS, Multi-Health 
Systems. 
Harmon-Jones, E., Vaughn-Scott, K., Mohr, S., Sigelman, J., & Harmon-Jones, C. (2004). The 
effect of manipulated sympathy and anger on left and right frontal cortical activity. 
Emotion, 4(1), 95. 
Hawkes, K., O’Connell, J. F., Jones, N. B., Alvarez, H., & Charnov, E. L. (1998). 
Grandmothering, menopause, and the evolution of human life histories. Proceedings of 
the National Academy of Sciences, 95(3), 1336-1339. 
Hawkins, H. C. (2001). Police officer burnout: a partial replication of Maslach's burnout 
inventory. Police Quarterly, 4(3), 343-360. 
Herbek, T. A., & Yammarino, F. J. (1990). Empathy training for hospital staff nurses. Group & 
Organization Management, 15(3), 279-295. 
Hill, E. L., & Frith, U. (2003). Understanding autism: insights from mind and brain. Philos Trans 
R Soc Lond B Biol Sci, 358(1430), 281-289. 
Hoffman, M. L. (1984). Interaction of affect and cognition in empathy. Emotions, cognition, and 
behavior, 103-131. 
Holt, T. J., & Blevins, K. R. (2011). Examining Job Stress and Satisfaction Among Digital 
Forensic Examiners. Journal of Contemporary Criminal Justice, 27(2), 230-250. 
Hong, S. I., & Morrow-Howell, N. (2010). Health outcomes of Experience Corps®: A high-
commitment volunteer program. Social Science & Medicine, 71(2), 414-420. 
House, T.H., & Milligan, W.L. . (1976). Autonomic responses to modeled distress in prison 
psychopaths. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 34, 556-560. 
Ickes, W. (1997). Empathic Accuracy. New York: The Guilford Press. 
Ickes, W., Oriña, M. M., & Simpson, J. A. (2003). When accuracy hurts, and when it helps: a test 
of the empathic accuracy model in marital interactions. 
35 
 
Inbar, Y., Pizarro, D. A., & Bloom, P. (2012). Disgusting smells cause decreased liking of gay 
men. Emotion, 12(1), 23-27. 
Ironson, G. (2007). Altruism and Health in HIV. In S. Post (Ed.), Altruism and Health (pp. 70-
81). New York, NY: Oxford University Press. 
Ironson, G., Solomon, G., Balbin, E., O’Cleirigh, C., George, A., Kumar, M., et al. (2002). The 
ironson-woods spirituality/religiousness index is associated with long survival, health 
behaviors, less distress, and low cortisol in people with HIV/AIDS. Annals of Behavioral 
Medicine, 24(1), 34-48. 
Jolliffe, D., & Farrington, D. P. (2004). Empathy and offending: A systematic review and meta-
analysis. Aggression and Violent Behavior, 9(5), 441-476. 
Jones, W., Bellugi, U., Lai, Z., Chiles, M., Reilly, J., Lincoln, A., et al. (2000). II. 
Hypersociability in Williams Syndrome. J Cogn Neurosci, 12 Suppl 1, 30-46. 
Kalliopuska, M. (1983). Relationship between moral judgment and empathy. Psychological 
Reports, 53, 575-578. 
Kalliopuska, M. (1992). Attitudes towards health, health behaviour, and personality factors 
among school students very high on empathy. Psychological Reports, 70(3), 1119-1122. 
Keaveny, T. J., & McGann, A. F. (1978). Behavioral dimensions associated with students' global 
ratings of college professors. Research in Higher Education, 9(4), 333-345. 
Kennedy, D. P., & Adolphs, R. (2012). The social brain in psychiatric and neurological 
disorders. Trends Cogn Sci, 16(11), 559-572. 
Klein-Tasman, B. P., & Mervis, C. B. (2003). Distinctive personality characteristics of 8-, 9-, 
and 10-year-olds with Williams syndrome. Dev Neuropsychol, 23(1-2), 269-290. 
Klimecki, O., & Singer, T. (2011). Empathic distress fatigue rather than compassion fatigue? 
Integrating findings from empathy research in psychology and social neuroscience. 
Pathological altruism, 368-383. 
Koenigs, M., Young, L., Adolphs, R., Tranel, D., Cushman, F., Hauser, M., et al. (2007). 
Damage to the prefrontal cortex increases utilitarian moral judgements. Nature, 
446(7138), 908-911. 
Kogut, T., & Ritov, I. (2005). The “identified victim” effect: An identified group, or just a single 
individual? Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 18(3), 157-167. 
Kok, B. E., Coffey, K. A., Cohn, M. A., Catalino, L. I., Vacharkulksemsuk, T., Algoe, S. B., et 
al. (2013). How Positive Emotions Build Physical Health Perceived Positive Social 
Connections Account for the Upward Spiral Between Positive Emotions and Vagal Tone. 
Psychological Science. 
Konrath, S. (2013). The power of philanthropy and volunteering. In F. H. a. C. C. (Eds.) (Ed.): 
Wiley Press. 
Konrath, S., & Brown, S. L. (2012). The effects of giving on givers. In N. Roberts & M. 
Newman (Eds.), Handbook of Health and Social Relationships: American Psychological 
Association. 
Konrath, S., Bushman, B., & Campbell, W. K. (2006). Attenuating the link between threatened 
egotism and aggression. Psychol Sci, 17(11), 995-1001. 
Konrath, S., & Fuhrel-Forbis, A. (2011). Self-rated caring traits are associated with lower 
mortality in older adults. unpublished data. 
36 
 
Konrath, S., Fuhrel-Forbis, A., Liu, M., O'Brien, E., Wondra, J., & Chopik, W. (2012). 
Empathizing causes declines in blood glucose: Ego depletion or stress regulation? Paper 
presented at the Association for Psychological Science, Chicago. 
Konrath, S., Fuhrel-Forbis, A., Lou, A., & Brown, S. L. (2012). Motives for Volunteering Are 
Associated with Mortality Risk in Older Adults. Health Psychology, 31(1), 87-96. 
Konrath, S., O'Brien, E., & Hsing, C. (2011). Changes in dispositional empathy in American 
college students over time: a meta-analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 
15(2), 180-198. 
Kosfeld, M., Heinrichs, M., Zak, P. J., Fischbacher, U., & Fehr, E. (2005). Oxytocin increases 
trust in humans. Nature, 435(7042), 673-676. 
Krakowski, M. (2003). Violence and serotonin: influence of impulse control, affect regulation, 
and social functioning. J Neuropsychiatry Clin Neurosci, 15(3), 294-305. 
Krause, M. (2009). Identifying and managing stress in child pornography and child exploitation 
investigators. Journal of Police and Criminal Psychology, 24(1), 22-29. 
Krause, N., & Shaw, B. A. (2000). Giving Social Support to Others, Socioeconomic Status, and 
Changes in Self-Esteem in Late Life. The Journals of Gerontology Series B: 
Psychological Sciences and Social Sciences, 55(6), S323-S333. 
Krebs, D. (1975). Empathy and altruism. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 32(6), 
1134. 
Kubzansky, L. D., Mendes, W. B., Appleton, A. A., Block, J., & Adler, G. K. (2012). A heartfelt 
response: Oxytocin effects on response to social stress in men and women. Biological 
psychology, 90(1), 1-9. 
Kurtz, R. R., & Grummon, D. L. (1972). Different approaches to the measurement of therapist 
empathy and their relationship to therapy outcomes. Journal of consulting and clinical 
psychology, 39(1), 106. 
Lackner, H. K., Goswami, N., Hingofer-Szalkay, H., Papousek, I., Scharfetter, H., Furlan, R., et 
al. (2010). Effects of Stimuli on Cardiovascular Reactivity Occurring at Regular Intervals 
During Mental Stress. Journal of Psychophysiology, 24(1), 48-60. 
Lacroix, A., Guidetti, M., Roge, B., & Reilly, J. (2009). Recognition of emotional and 
nonemotional facial expressions: a comparison between Williams syndrome and autism. 
Res Dev Disabil, 30(5), 976-985. 
Lahdenperä, M., Lummaa, V., Helle, S., Tremblay, M., & Russell, A. F. (2004). Fitness benefits 
of prolonged post-reproductive lifespan in women. Nature, 428(6979), 178-181. 
Langer, E. J., & Rodin, J. (1976). The effects of choice and enhanced personal responsibility for 
the aged: A field experiment in an institutional setting. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 34(2), 191-198. 
Lau, B., Falk, E., & Konrath, S. (2013). The effects of empathy and race-salience in intergroup 
interactions. Paper in progress. 
Lee, M., & Prentice, N. M. (1988). Interrelations of empathy, cognition, and moral reasoning 
with dimensions of juvenile delinquency. J Abnorm Child Psychol, 16(2), 127-139. 
Levenson, R. W., & Ruef, A. M. (1992). Empathy: a physiological substrate. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 63(2), 234. 
Liang, J., Krause, N. M., & Bennett, J. M. (2001). Social Exchange and Well-Being: Is Giving 
Better Than Receiving? Psychology and Aging, 16(3), 511-523. 
37 
 
Liu, M., & Konrath, S. (2013). Empty nest but not empty heart: Giving support to adult children 
lowers mortality risk in older adults. Under review. 
Lough, S., Kipps, C. M., Treise, C., Watson, P., Blair, J. R., & Hodges, J. R. (2006). Social 
reasoning, emotion and empathy in frontotemporal dementia. Neuropsychologia, 44(6), 
950-958. 
Lu, L. (1997). Social support, reciprocity, and well-being. Journal of Social Psychology, 137(5), 
618-628. 
Lu, L., & Argyle, M. (1992). Receiving and giving support: Effects on relationships and well-
being Counselling Psychology Quarterly, 5(2), 123-133. 
Maslach, C., Jackson, S. E., & Leiter, M. P. (1996). Maslach burnout inventory manual . 
Mountain View, CA. CPP Inc. 
Mathersul, D., McDonald, S., & Rushby, J. A. (2013). Understanding advanced theory of mind 
and empathy in high-functioning adults with autism spectrum disorder. Journal of 
Clinical and Experimental Neuropsychology(ahead-of-print), 1-14. 
Mathieu, F. (2007). Running on Empty: Compassion Fatigue in Health Professionals. Rehab & 
Community Care Medicine, 1-7. 
Mathur, V. A., Harada, T., Lipke, T., & Chiao, J. Y. (2010). Neural basis of extraordinary 
empathy and altruistic motivation. NeuroImage, 51(4), 1468-1475. 
Mayer, S., Erickson, T., Briggs, H., Crocker, J., Liberzon, I., & Abelson, J. (2011). 
Compassionate goal orientation interacts with resilience to modulate cortisol response to 
the Trier Social Stress Test. International Society of Psychoneuroendocrinology. 
McClellan, W., Stanwyck, D., & Anson, C. (1993). Social support and subsequent mortality 
among patients with end-stage renal disease. Journal of the American Society of 
Nephrology, 4(4), 1028-1034. 
McDougall, W. (1908). An introduction to social psychology. London: Methuen. 
Mendez, M. F., & Shapira, J. S. (2009). Altered emotional morality in frontotemporal dementia. 
Cogn Neuropsychiatry, 14(3), 165-179. 
Miller, P. A., & Eisenberg, N. (1988). The relation of empathy to aggressive and 
externalizing/antisocial behavior. Psychological Bulletin, 103(3), 324. 
Mitchell, P., Robinson, E. J., Isaacs, J. E., & Nye, R. M. (1996). Contamination in reasoning 
about false belief: an instance of realist bias in adults but not children. Cognition, 59(1), 
1-21. 
Moretto, G., Ladavas, E., Mattioli, F., & di Pellegrino, G. (2010). A psychophysiological 
investigation of moral judgment after ventromedial prefrontal damage. J Cogn Neurosci, 
22(8), 1888-1899. 
Moses, A. (2012). Child Parent Relationship Therapy for Parents of Children with Disruptive 
Behavior. Unpublished dissertation, Western Michigan University. 
Mugford, R. A., & M’Comisky, J. G. (1975). Some recent work on the psychotherapeutic value 
of cage birds with old people. Pet animals and society, 54-65. 
Müller, B. C., Leeuwen, M. L., Baaren, R. B., Bekkering, H., & Dijksterhuis, A. (2013). 
Empathy is a beautiful thing: Empathy predicts imitation only for attractive others. 
Scandinavian Journal of Psychology. 
Mullins-Nelson, J. L., Salekin, R. T., & Leistico, A. R. (2006). Psychopathy, empathy, and 
perspecitve taking ability in a community sample: Impliciation for the successful 
psychopathy concept. . International Journal of Forensic Mental Health, 5, 133-149. 
38 
 
Navarrete, C. D., McDonald, M. M., Mott, M. L., & Asher, B. (2012). Virtual morality: Emotion 
and action in a simulated three-dimensional “trolley problem”. Emotion, 12(2), 364. 
Nelson-Gardell, D., & Harris, D. (2003). Childhood abuse history, secondary traumatic stress, 
and child welfare workers. Child Welfare: Journal of Policy, Practice, and Program. 
Noblet, A., Rodwell, J., & Allisey, A. (2009). Job stress in the law enforcement sector: 
comparing the linear, non‐linear and interaction effects of working conditions. Stress and 
Health, 25(1), 111-120. 
Norscia, I., & Palagi, E. (2011). Yawn contagion and empathy in Homo sapiens. PLoS ONE, 
6(12), e28472. 
O’Connor, L. E., Berry, J. W., Weiss, J., & Gilbert, P. (2002). Guilt, fear, submission, and 
empathy in depression. Journal of Affective Disorders, 71(1-3), 19-27. 
Oakley, B., Knafo, A., & Madhavan, G. (2011). Pathological altruism: Oxford University Press. 
Osman, S. L. (2011). Predicting rape empathy based on victim, perpetrator, and participant 
gender, and history of sexual aggression. Sex Roles, 64, 506-515. 
Osofsky, J. D. (2011). Vicarious Traumatization and the Need for Self-Care in Working with 
Traumatized Young Children. In J. D. Osofsky (Ed.), Clinical Work with Traumatized 
Young Children (pp. 336-348). New York, NY: The Guilford Press. 
Pace, T. W., Negi, L. T., Adame, D. D., Cole, S. P., Sivilli, T. I., Brown, T. D., et al. (2009). 
Effect of compassion meditation on neuroendocrine, innate immune and behavioral 
responses to psychosocial stress. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 34(1), 87-98. 
Paleari, F. G., Regalia, C., & Fincham, F. (2005). Marital quality, forgiveness, empathy, and 
rumination: A longitudinal analysis. Personality and Social Psychology Bulletin, 31(3), 
368-378. 
Panksepp, J. (1998). Affective neuroscience: The foundations of human and animal emotions: 
Oxford University Press. 
Penner, L. A., Cline, R. J., Albrecht, T. L., Harper, F. W., Peterson, A. M., Taub, J. M., et al. 
(2008). Parents' empathic responses and pain and distress in pediatric patients. Basic and 
Applied Social Psychology, 30(2), 102-113. 
Pham, T. H., Philippot, P., & Rime, B. (2000). Subjective and autonomic responses to emotion 
induction in psychopaths. Encephale, 26(1), 45-51. 
Piferi, R. L., & Lawler, K. A. (2006). Social support and ambulatory blood pressure: An 
examination of both receiving and giving. International Journal of Psychophysiology, 
62(2), 328-336. 
Plesa-Skwerer, D., Faja, S., Schofield, C., Verbalis, A., & Tager-Flusberg, H. (2006). Perceiving 
facial and vocal expressions of emotion in individuals with Williams syndrome. Am J 
Ment Retard, 111(1), 15-26. 
Plesa Skwerer, D., Borum, L., Verbalis, A., Schofield, C., Crawford, N., Ciciolla, L., et al. 
(2009). Autonomic responses to dynamic displays of facial expressions in adolescents 
and adults with Williams syndrome. Soc Cogn Affect Neurosci, 4(1), 93-100. 
Pooler, D. K. (2008). Social workers and distress: Implications for sustaining a healthy 
workforce. Journal of Workplace Behavioral Health, 23(4), 445-466. 
Porter, M. A., Coltheart, M., & Langdon, R. (2007). The neuropsychological basis of 
hypersociability in Williams and Down syndrome. Neuropsychologia, 45(12), 2839-
2849. 
39 
 
Post, S. G. (2007). Altruism and health: Perspectives from empirical research: Oxford 
University Press. 
Preston, S. D. (2013). The Origins of Altruism in Offspring Care. Psychological Bulletin, in 
press. 
Preylo, B. D., & Arikawa, H. (2008). Comparison of vegetarians and non-vegetarians on pet 
attitude and empathy. Anthrozoos: A Multidisciplinary Journal of The Interactions of 
People & Animals, 21(4), 387-395. 
Prinz, J. J. (2011). Against empathy. The Southern Journal of Philosophy, 49(s1), 214-233. 
Prinz, J. J. (2011). Is empathy necessary for morality Perspectives on Empathy: Goldie, P. 
Coplan, A. 
Riby, D., Bruce, V., & Jawaid, A. (2012). Everyone's friend? The case of Williams Syndrome. In 
B. Oakley, A. Knafo, G. Madhavan & D. S. Wilson (Eds.), Pathological Altruism. New 
York: Oxford University Press. 
Richell, R. A., Mitchell, D. G., Newman, C., Leonard, A., Baron-Cohen, S., & Blair, R. J. 
(2003). Theory of mind and psychopathy: can psychopathic individuals read the 
'language of the eyes'? Neuropsychologia, 41(5), 523-526. 
Richardson, D. R., Hammock, G. S., Smith, S. M., Gardner, W., & Signo, M. (1994). Empathy 
as a cognitive inhibitor of interpersonal aggression. Aggressive Behavior, 20(4), 275-289. 
Riess, H., Bailey, R. W., Dunn, E. J., & Phillips, M. (2012). Empathy training for resident 
physicians: a randomized controlled trial of a neuroscience-informed curriculum. Journal 
of general internal medicine, 27(10), 1280-1286. 
Rosen, H. J., Gorno–Tempini, M. L., Goldman, W., Perry, R., Schuff, N., Weiner, M., et al. 
(2002). Patterns of brain atrophy in frontotemporal dementia and semantic dementia. 
Neurology, 58(2), 198-208. 
Rosenstein, P. (1995). Parental levels of empathy as related to risk assessment in child protective 
services. Child abuse & neglect, 19(11), 1349-1360. 
Rumble, A. C., Van Lange, P. A., & Parks, C. D. (2010). The benefits of empathy: When 
empathy may sustain cooperation in social dilemmas. European Journal of Social 
Psychology, 40(5), 856-866. 
Saakvitne, K. W., & Pearlman, L. A. (1996). Transforming the pain: A workbook on vicarious 
traumatization. New York, NY: WW Norton & Co. 
Schewe, P. A. (2007). Interventions to prevent sexual violence. Handbook of injury and violence 
prevention, 223-240. 
Schewe, P. A., & O'Donohue, W. (1993). Sexual abuse prevention with high-risk males: The 
roles of victim empathy and rape myths. Violence and Victims, 8(4), 339-351. 
Schwartz, C., Keyl, P., Marcum, J., & Bode, R. (2009). Helping Others Shows Differential 
Benefits on Health and Well-being for Male and Female Teens. Journal of Happiness 
Studies, 10(4), 431-448. 
Schwartz, C., Meisenhelder, J. B., Ma, Y., & Reed, G. (2003). Altruistic Social Interest 
Behaviors Are Associated With Better Mental Health. Psychosomatic Medicine, 65(5), 
778-785. 
Schwartz, C., & Sendor, R. M. (1999). Helping others helps oneself: response shift effects in 
peer support. Social Science &amp; Medicine, 48(11), 1563-1575. 
Selvaraj, S., Faulkner, P., Mouchlianitis, E., Turkheimer, F., Rosso, L., Roiser, J. P., et al. 
(2012). P-800 - How do antidepressants work? A Positron Emission Tomography (PET) 
40 
 
study of brain serotonin levels and affect regulation. European Psychiatry, 27, 
Supplement 1(0), 1. 
Sethre-Hofstad, L., Stansbury, K., & Rice, M. A. (2002). Attunement of maternal and child 
adrenocortical response to child challenge. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 27(6), 731-747. 
Sevillano, V., Aragonés, J. I., & Schultz, P. W. (2007). Perspective taking, environmental 
concern, and the moderating role of dispositional empathy. Environment and behavior, 
39(5), 685-705. 
Shamay-Tsoory, S. G., Tomer, R., Berger, B. D., & Aharon-Peretz, J. (2003). Characterization of 
empathy deficits following prefrontal brain damage: the role of the right ventromedial 
prefrontal cortex. Nature Neuroscience, 15(3), 324-337. 
Shanafelt, T. D., West, C., Zhao, X., Novotny, P., Kolars, J., Habermann, T., et al. (2005). 
Relationship Between Increased Personal Well-Being and Enhanced Empathy Among 
Internal Medicine Residents. Journal of General Internal Medicine, 20(7), 559-564. 
Shelton, M. L., & Rogers, R. W. (1981). Fear‐Arousing and Empathy‐Arousing Appeals to Help: 
The Pathos of Persuasion. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 11(4), 366-378. 
Sibicky, M. E., Schroeder, D. A., & Dovidio, J. F. (1995). Empathy and Helping: Considering 
the Consequences of Intervention. Basic and Applied Social Psychology, 16(4), 435-453. 
Simpson, J. A., Ickes, W., & Blackstone, T. (1995). When the head protects the heart: Empathic 
accuracy in dating relationships. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 69, 629-
629. 
Simpson, J. A., Ickes, W., & Grich, J. (1999). When accuracy hurts: Reactions of anxious-
ambivalent dating partners to a relationship-threatening situation. Journal of Personality 
and Social Psychology, 76(5), 754-769. 
Singer, T., Seymour, B., O'Doherty, J. P., Stephan, K. E., Dolan, R. J., & Frith, C. D. (2006). 
Empathic neural responses are modulated by the perceived fairness of others. Nature, 
439(7075), 466-469. 
Smith, A. M., Loving, T. J., Crockett, E. E., & Campbell, L. (2009). What’s Closeness Got to Do 
with It? Men’s and Women’s Cortisol Responses When Providing and Receiving 
Support. Psychosomatic Medicine, 71(8), 843-851. 
Smith, C. A., & Frieze, I. H. (2003). Examining Rape Empathy From the Perspective of the 
Victim and the Assailant. Journal of Applied Social Psychology, 33(3), 476-479. 
Sober, E., & Wilson, D. S. (1998). Unto others: The evolution and psychology of unselfish 
behavior: Harvard University Press. 
Sonnby-Borgström, M., Jönsson, P., & Svensson, O. (2003). Emotional empathy as related to 
mimicry reactions at different levels of information processing. Journal of Nonverbal 
Behavior, 27(1), 3-23. 
Sonnby–Borgström, M. (2002). Automatic mimicry reactions as related to differences in 
emotional empathy. Scandinavian Journal of Psychology, 43(5), 433-443. 
Sprang, G., Clark, J. J., & Whitt-Woosley, A. (2007). Compassion fatigue, compassion 
satisfaction, and burnout: Factors impacting a professional's quality of life. Journal of 
Loss and Trauma, 12(3), 259-280. 
Steffen, P., & Masters, K. (2005). Does compassion mediate the intrinsic religion-health 
relationship? Annals of Behavioral Medicine, 30(3), 217-224. 
Stellar, J. E., Manzo, V. M., Kraus, M. W., & Keltner, D. (2012). Class and compassion: 
Socioeconomic factors predict responses to suffering. Emotion, 12(3), 449. 
41 
 
Strazdins, L., & Broom, D. H. (2007). The Mental Health Costs and Benefits of Giving Social 
Support. International Journal of Stress Management, 14(4), 370-385. 
Swain, J. E., Konrath, S., Brown, S. L., Finegood, E. D., Akce, L. B., Dayton, C. J., et al. (2012). 
Parenting and beyond: Common neurocircuits underlying parental and altruistic 
caregiving. Parenting, 12(2-3), 115-123. 
Swain, J. E., Lorberbaum, J. P., Kose, S., & Strathearn, L. (2007). Brain basis of early parent–
infant interactions: psychology, physiology, and in vivo functional neuroimaging studies. 
Journal of Child Psychology and Psychiatry, 48(3-4), 262-287. 
Tager-Flusberg, H., & Sullivan, K. (2000). A componential view of theory of mind: evidence 
from Williams syndrome. Cognition, 76(1), 59-90. 
Taylor, N., & Signal, T. (2005). Empathy and attitudes to animals. Anthrozoos: A 
Multidisciplinary Journal of The Interactions of People & Animals, 18(1), 18-27. 
Tehrani, N. (2010). Compassion fatigue: experiences in occupational health, human resources, 
counselling and police. Occupational Medicine, 60(2), 133-138. 
Thomas, B. (2012). Predictors of vicarious trauma and secondary traumatic stress among 
correctional officers. Philadelphia College of Osteopathic Medicine, Unpublished 
dissertation, Department of Psychology. 
Thomas, G., & Fletcher, G. (2003). Mind-reading accuracy in intimate relationships: assessing 
the roles of the relationship, the target, and the judge. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 85(6), 1079. 
Thomson, J. J. (1986). Rights, Restitution, and Risk: Essays. Cambridge, MA: Harvard 
University Press. 
Tkach, C. (2005). Unlocking the treasury of human kindness : enduring improvements in mood, 
happiness, and self-evaluations. Unpublished doctoral dissertation: University of 
California, Riverside. 
Truax, C. B., Wargo, D. G., Frank, J. D., Imber, S. D., Battle, C. C., Hoehn-Saric, R., et al. 
(1966). Therapist empathy, genuineness, and warmth and patient therapeutic outcome. 
Journal of Consulting Psychology; Journal of Consulting Psychology, 30(5), 395. 
Twenge, J., & Campbell, W. K. (2003). “Isn’t It Fun to Get the Respect That We’re Going to 
Deserve?” Narcissism, Social Rejection, and Aggression. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 29(2), 261-272. 
Twenge, J., Konrath, S., Foster, J., Campbell, W. K., & Bushman, B. (2008). Egos inflat ing over 
time: a cross-temporal meta-analysis of the Narcissistic Personality Inventory. Journal of 
Personality, 76(4), 875-902; discussion 903-828. 
Udipi, S., Veach, P. M. C., Kao, J., & LeRoy, B. S. (2008). The psychic costs of empathic 
engagement: personal and demographic predictors of genetic counselor compassion 
fatigue. Journal of genetic counseling, 17(5), 459-471. 
Uhlmann, E. L., Zhu, L. L., & Tannenbaum, D. (2013). When it takes a bad person to do the 
right thing. Cognition, 126(2), 326-334. 
Uvnäs-Moberg, K. (1998). Oxytocin may mediate the benefits of positive social interaction and 
emotions. Psychoneuroendocrinology, 23(8), 819-835. 
Vaananen, A., Buunk, B. P., Kivimaki, M., Pentti, J., & Vahtera, J. (2005). When it is better to 
give than to receive: Long-term health effects of perceived reciprocity in support 
exchange. Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 89(2), 176. 
42 
 
Vescio, T. K., Sechrist, G. B., & Paolucci, M. P. (2003). Perspective taking and prejudice 
reduction: the mediational role of empathy arousal and situational attributions. European 
Journal of Social Psychology, 33(4), 455-472. 
Violanti, J. M., & Aron, F. (1995). Police stressors: Variations in perception among police 
personnel. Journal of Criminal Justice, 23(3), 287-294. 
Vitaglione, G. D., & Barnett, M. A. (2003). Assessing a new dimension of empathy: Empathic 
anger as a predictor of helping and punishing desires. Motivation and Emotion, 27(4), 
301-325. 
Vorauer, J. D., Hunter, A., Main, K. J., & Roy, S. A. (2000). Meta-stereotype activation: 
evidence from indirect measures for specific evaluative concerns experienced by 
members of dominant groups in intergroup interaction. Journal of Personality and Social 
Psychology, 78(4), 690. 
Vorauer, J. D., Main, K. J., & O'Connell, G. B. (1998). How do individuals expect to be viewed 
by members of lower status groups? Content and implications of meta-stereotypes. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 75(4), 917. 
Vorauer, J. D., Martens, V., & Sasaki, S. J. (2009). When trying to understand detracts from 
trying to behave: effects of perspective taking in intergroup interaction. Journal of 
Personality and Social Psychology, 96(4), 811. 
Vorauer, J. D., & Sasaki, S. J. (2009). Helpful only in the abstract? Ironic effects of empathy in 
intergroup interaction. Psychological Science, 20(2), 191-197. 
Vorauer, J. D., & Sasaki, S. J. (2012). The pitfalls of empathy as a default intergroup interaction 
strategy: Distinct effects of trying to empathize with a lower status outgroup member 
who does versus does not express distress. Journal of Experimental Social Psychology, 
48(2), 519-524. 
Walker, G. J., Chapman, R., & Bricker, K. (2003). Thinking like a park: the effects of sense of 
place, perspective-taking, and empathy on pro-environmental intentions. Journal of Park 
and Recreation Administration, 21(4), 71-86. 
Watt, D. (2005). Social bonds and the nature of empathy. Journal of Consciousness Studies, 
12(8-10), 8-10. 
Watt, D. (2007). Toward a neuroscience of empathy: Integrating affective and cognitive 
perspectives. Neuropsychoanalysis: An Interdisciplinary Journal for Psychoanalysis and 
the Neurosciences, 9(2), 119-140. 
Waxman, H. C. (1983). Effect of teachers' empathy on students' motivation. Psychological 
Reports, 53(2), 489-490. 
West, C. P., Huschka, M. M., Novotny, P. J., Sloan, J. A., Kolars, J. C., Habermann, T. M., et al. 
(2006). Association of perceived medical errors with resident distress and empathy. 
JAMA: The Journal of the American Medical Association, 296(9), 1071-1078. 
Wink, P., & Dillon, M. (2002). Spiritual Development Across the Adult Life Course: Findings 
from a Longitudinal Study. Journal of Adult Development, 9(1), 79-94. 
Xu, X., Zuo, X., Wang, X., & Han, S. (2009). Do you feel my pain? Racial group membership 
modulates empathic neural responses. The Journal of Neuroscience, 29(26), 8525-8529. 
Zak, P. J., Kurzban, R., & Matzner, W. T. (2004). The neurobiology of trust. Annals of the New 
York Academy of Sciences, 1032(1), 224-227. 
Zak, P. J., Stanton, A. A., & Ahmadi, S. (2007). Oxytocin increases generosity in humans. PLoS 
ONE, 2(11), e1128. 
